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CHARTING THE CONTOURS OF A COPYRIGHT 
REGIME OPTIMIZED FOR ENGINEERED 
GENETIC CODE 
CHRISTOPHER M. HOLMAN* 
Abstract 
There is a growing disconnect between the traditional patent-centric 
approach to protecting biotechnological innovation and the emerging 
intellectual property imperatives of “synthetic biology,” a promising new 
manifestation of biotechnology that enables the design and construction of 
artificial biological pathways, organisms or devices, as well as the redesign 
of existing natural biological systems. As explained in previous articles, one 
way to deal with this disconnect would be to expand the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter to encompass engineered genetic sequences, 
much in the way that copyright was expanded in the 1970s and 1980s to 
include computer programs. The present article expands upon that work 
and explores the possible contours of a copyright regime encompassing 
engineered genetic code (EGC), explaining how a policy-optimized 
application of existing copyright doctrine, facilitated perhaps by some 
relatively conservative amendments to the Copyright Statute, could provide 
synthetic biologists with a beneficial supplement to patents, while at the 
same time addressing legitimate concerns that have been raised in response 
to this proposal. The use of the term “EGC,” as opposed to “DNA,” is 
intended to focus the attention where it rightly belongs, i.e., on the 
information content encoded by a synthetic genetic sequence, and to make 
clear that I am in no way proposing that naturally occurring DNA 
sequences should be copyrighted. It also highlights the close analogy 
between computer code and engineered DNA sequences. The article 
includes a description of a recent attempt to register an engineered genetic 
sequence as a copyrighted work with the U.S. Copyright Office (the 
“Copyright Office” or “Office”). 
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I. Introduction 
Synthetic biology has been defined as “an emerging area of research that 
can broadly be described as the design and construction of novel artificial 
biological pathways, organisms or devices, or the redesign of existing 
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natural biological systems.”1 In essence, it is the next generation of the 
biotechnology revolution that began with the development of the 
foundational tools for engineering DNA, commonly referred to as genetic 
engineering, in the 1970s.2 While the earliest products of biotechnology 
involved relatively simple rearrangements of naturally occurring genetic 
elements, synthetic biology is characterized by much more extreme 
deviations from nature.3 Products of synthetic biology include entirely 
synthetic genes and complex synthetic genetic systems that increasingly 
represent works of purposeful human design and engineering rather than 
mere recombinations of DNA sequences derived from nature.4 There is 
great hope that advances in synthetic biology will result in sustainable 
technologies that address many of society’s most pressing concerns 
regarding healthcare, nutrition, and energy.5 
If this technology is to live up to its potential, there must be adequate 
incentives in place to fund the research, development, and 
commercialization of synthetic biology products. As explained in a 
previous article, however, there is a growing disconnect between the 
traditional, patent-centric approach to protecting biotechnological invention 
and the intellectual property imperatives of synthetic biology.6 That article 
suggested that one way to deal with this disconnect is to expand copyright 
to encompass synthetic DNA sequences in the same way that copyright was 
expanded in the 1970s and 1980s to encompass computer programs.  
I have explained in another article that some forms of engineered DNA 
sequences should be considered copyrightable subject matter, and indeed 
that such an expansion of the recognized scope of copyright would not 
require any revision of the Copyright Act.7 In the present article, I expand 
upon that work and explore the possible contours of a copyright regime that 
would encompass synthetic DNA. Significantly, the present article focuses 
the discussion primarily on copyright for what I will refer to as “engineered 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Synthetic Biology 101: What Is Synthetic Biology?, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT 
(citation omitted), http://www.synbioproject.org/topics/synbio101/definition/ (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2016). 
 2. Christopher M. Holman, Developments in Synthetic Biology Are Altering the IP 
Imperatives of Biotechnology, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385, 388-403 (2015) [hereinafter 
Holman, Developments]. 
 3. Id. at 418-41. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 442-54. 
 7. See generally Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2011) [hereinafter Holman, Copyright]. 
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genetic code” (“EGC”), rather than DNA per se. In so doing, my intent is to 
focus the attention where it rightly belongs, i.e., on the information content 
encoded by a synthetic genetic sequence. 
This distinction between copyright for EGC and copyright for DNA is 
significant and bears emphasis. Historically, any discussion of extending 
copyright to biotechnology has tended to cast the debate in terms of 
“copyright on DNA,” which, for a host of reasons, is loaded terminology 
invoking concerns about the possibility of property rights extending to 
naturally occurring genes and, indeed, the ownership of human beings 
themselves. In fact, DNA is best conceptualized as a medium for storing 
and conveying genetic information, analogous to a DVD on which a 
copyrighted audiovisual work is recorded, or the ink and paper traditionally 
used to store and convey an author’s literary expression. It is not the 
physical material comprising the book, DVD, or DNA that is copyrighted, 
or for that matter which provides value, but rather the information 
embodied in the medium. 
EGC represents a form of human-made expression that is closely 
analogous to engineered computer code, and, as is the case with most 
copyrighted works, EGC can be embodied in a variety of mediums. DNA is 
of course one of the most important of these mediums, but there are others, 
such as RNA, a related class of macromolecules that, while chemically 
similar to DNA, is nonetheless physically and functionally distinct. There 
are also a variety of synthetic analogues of RNA and DNA which can be 
used to embody EGC and to convey its information content.  
Furthermore, EGC can be represented in a variety of non-biological 
media by, for example, writing the sequence down on a piece of paper or 
recording it on computer-readable media. EGC embodied in such non-
biological media is entirely analogous to representations of computer code 
that are directed toward a human reader rather than a machine, as printed 
source code might be read from paper. Although EGC constitutes only one 
aspect of biotechnology, it is an extremely important one and could be 
leveraged to provide meaningful and appropriately tailored protection for a 
variety of important biotechnological innovations.8 
The present article explains how a policy-optimized application of 
existing copyright doctrine, facilitated perhaps by some relatively 
conservative amendments to the Copyright Statute, could provide a 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See Guide to Biotechnology 2008, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., 
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/files/BiotechGuide2008.pdf (last visited May 12, 2016) 
(“DNA [is] the cornerstone of biotechnology”). 
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beneficial supplement to patents, while at the same time addressing the 
concerns of skeptics. Part II describes growing interest in an extension of 
copyright to EGC, not only among academics, but also intellectual property 
attorneys and biotechnologists. Part III describes a recent collaborative 
attempt by myself, a law professor, and a leading synthetic biology 
company to register an engineered genetic sequence as a copyrighted work 
with the U.S. Copyright Office. Part IV explains how copyright could 
provide a useful and socially desirable supplement to patent protection but 
would not entirely supplant the role of patents in protecting EGC. Part V 
discusses various attributes of a copyright regime that protects EGC in a 
manner that advances innovation policy. Part VI, the heart of the article, 
explores the manner in which existing copyright doctrine could be applied 
to EGC in a manner best suited to promote public policy, which could 
involve congressional action. 
II. A Growing Interest in Copyright for EGC 
Academics have long debated whether DNA might be considered 
copyrightable, and, if so, whether such an expansion of recognized 
copyrightable subject matter would constitute good policy.9 Today, 
however, there appears to be a growing interest among a more pragmatic 
constituency of non-academics.10 The earliest example of this of which I 
am aware comes from a personal conversation I had with a man who served 
as Chief IP Counsel at a leading gene-discovery company from 1999 to 
2002. He told me that, during that timeframe, the company had considered 
the human genetic sequences it was discovering to be copyrightable and 
had formally attempted to register them as copyrighted works with the U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 711-14. See generally Dan L. Burk, 
Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469, 531–32 (1989); 
Jorge A. Goldstein, Copyrightability of Genetic Works, 2 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 138 (1984); 
Irving Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
191 (1982); Andrew W. Torrance, DNA Copyright, 46 VAL. L. REV. 1 (2011); Andrew W. 
Torrance, Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J. L., SCI. & TECH. 629 (2010) 
[hereinafter Torrance, Synthesizing Law]; Donna Smith, Comment, Copyright Protection for 
the Intellectual Property Rights to Recombinant Deoxyribonucleic Acid: A Proposal, 19 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 1083, 1096–1108 (1988). 
 10. See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Bioengineers Look Beyond Patents: Synthetic-biology 
Company Pushes Open-source Models, 499 NATURE 16 (2013). 
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Copyright Office. These attempts at registration were apparently denied, 
and the company does not appear to have appealed these decisions.11 
Since the publication of my first DNA copyright article, several 
companies interested in pursuing copyright in engineered DNA sequences 
have contacted me. For example, an attorney representing a synthetic-
biology company (which was developing synthetic microorganisms for use 
in a variety of applications, such as living biosensors capable of detecting 
toxins and pathogenic organisms) learned of my work and wanted to know 
whether I thought copyright could be used to protect his company’s 
products. He explained that the development of these products was an 
iterative process, involving continual updating and revisions of the 
underlying EGC, and that patent protection was a poor fit due to the cost 
and long lag time between the filing of a patent application and issuance of 
a patent. Trade secret was not up to the task either, since the engineered 
microorganisms (which inherently incorporate the EGC) were commercial 
products, and hence widely distributed to customers, much in the way 
computer software code is inherently made available to customers, and thus 
difficult to protect by trade secret law. This company’s predicament 
contrasts with more traditional biotechnology companies, particularly those 
that use bioengineering to produce drugs and are thus able to maintain 
physical control over engineered organisms and their genetic code.12 This 
attorney believed that copyright could play an important role in protecting 
the company’s proprietary EGC. Unfortunately, I had to inform him that 
copyright for EGC has yet to be recognized, and as a practical matter 
probably will not be anytime soon. 
Agricultural biotechnology could have the most to gain from an 
extension of copyright for EGC, at least in the near term. I have spoken 
with one attorney who used to work at a major agricultural biotechnology 
company, and he explained that his company considered the possibility for 
years. In fact, he related to me an interesting anecdote. Years ago, he was 
making a presentation in India to patent examiners, explaining his 
company’s position that engineered DNA and products such as seeds that 
incorporate engineered DNA should be patentable. One of the patent 
examiners spoke up and voiced his opinion that engineered DNA should 
not be patentable, but instead should be protected by copyright. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See infra Part III, which describes a letter from the Copyright Office stating that our 
appeal of the Office's decision to deny registration of an engineered DNA sequence was "a 
matter of first impression" for the Office. 
 12. See Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 422-28. 
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Attorneys at some of the leading intellectual property law firms in the 
United States are also seriously considering the potential applicability of 
copyright to EGC. I have been contacted by a number of attorneys working 
at these firms who have read my work and share my views regarding the 
legal and policy justifications for this extension of the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter. At least one major law firm is actively 
soliciting clients, looking for one that would be willing to pursue a 
copyright enforcement action with respect to engineered DNA. I learned of 
this through a conversation with an attorney currently working at a major 
agricultural biotechnology company. This attorney shared with me a 
PowerPoint presentation a law firm had recently presented at his company, 
essentially explaining that the time is right for biotechnology companies to 
assert their copyright in EGC by filing copyright infringement lawsuits 
against unauthorized users of the company’s proprietary EGC. It seems 
only a matter of time before the question of whether EGC can be 
copyrighted makes its way before the courts. 
In fact, one of the companies is so interested in the potential benefits of 
copyright for EGC that it agreed to work with me on a test case in which we 
attempted to register a synthetic, engineered DNA sequence with the U.S. 
Copyright Office as a copyrighted work.13 The company is ATUM 
(formerly DNA2.0), a leading synthetic biology company headquartered in 
Newark, California.14 Much of ATUM’s business involves designing and 
synthesizing EGC for its customers.15 In most cases, the company is not 
particularly interested in patenting this EGC, in part because it would be 
prohibitively expensive given the large number of engineered sequences the 
company is producing, particularly in view of the marginal commercial 
value of many of the sequences (at least compared to the EGC used in the 
manufacture of traditional biotechnology products such as drugs and seeds). 
The long lag time involved in getting a patent is also a substantial deterrent 
for a fast-moving company like ATUM, as is the current uncertainty 
regarding the patentability of gene-based inventions in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Myriad decision, which held that at least some synthetic 
DNA sequences are patent-ineligible.16 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See ATUM, https://www.atum.bio/ (last visited May 13, 2017). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); see 
also Mayo Collaborative Servs., v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (holding 
diagnostic processes applying natural law patent ineligible). 
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Moreover, ATUM seeks to foster a vibrant public domain in synthetic 
biology and would rather not contribute to a proliferation of patents that 
could unnecessarily limit access to building blocks of future innovation in 
the field.17 The desire of a company like ATUM to avoid cluttering the 
innovation landscape with an unnecessary number of patents reflects not 
only the ethos of many in the synthetic biology community, but also the 
very practical desire of a DNA-synthesis company to encourage freedom to 
operate in this technological space.18 
Much of ATUM’s business involves synthesizing DNA sequences to 
fulfill customers’ orders - essentially contract manufacturing. Some 
customers specify the DNA sequence to be synthesized, while others 
contract with ATUM to design and synthesize a novel DNA sequence that 
provides the functional attributes desired by that customer.19 In either event, 
trying to assess freedom to operate with respect to patent infringement can 
be an awesome task, particularly for a relatively lean company like ATUM 
that receives a multitude of orders for unique DNA sequences from a 
diverse array of customers. Although patents are publicly available 
documents that, in principle, provide notice to potential infringers, as a 
practical matter it can be very difficult and expensive to assess whether or 
not the manufacture of a synthetic sequence could result in an allegation of 
patent infringement, and the difficulty increases with the complexity of the 
sequence.  
There are a large number of issued patents relating to DNA sequences 
that would have to be considered in any thorough assessment of freedom to 
operate.20 Patent claims directed towards genetic sequences can be written 
in very broad terms, encompassing astronomical numbers of variants 
sharing some degree of structural and/or functional similarity.21 Even in 
cases where a third-party patent has been identified, the boundaries of 
patent claims can be hard to discern, even for an attorney, rendering it 
difficult at times to assess the potential for infringement liability. In many 
cases it is impossible to know whether a patent claim encompasses a 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Ledford, supra note 10, at 17. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See ATUM, supra note 14. 
 20. Christopher M. Holman, Debunking the Myth That Whole-Genome Sequencing 
Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 240 (2012) [hereinafter 
Holman, Debunking]. 
 21. Id.; see also Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified Version 
of the Blast Score as a Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of 
Related Protein Sequences, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 68 (2004). 
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product without determining claim scope in the context of patent litigation. 
Furthermore, many issued patents include invalid claims, but again, it is 
often the case that the invalidity is only determinable in the context of 
litigation or post-grant review by the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”), both of which can be prohibitively time-consuming and 
expensive, particularly in the context of synthetic biology. 
Patents relating to genes encoding fluorescent proteins provide an 
illustrative example. These genes have come to play an extremely important 
role in biotechnology and are used extensively in a variety of applications 
involving research and analytics. The first fluorescent proteins to be used in 
this manner were the green fluorescent proteins (“GFPs”), derived from 
fluorescent jellyfish.22 The discovery of GFPs not only led to a well-
deserved Nobel Prize, but also resulted in a family of patents, including 
some that include ambiguously drafted claims that could be interpreted as 
providing broad coverage over later-discovered fluorescent protein genes, 
potentially even genes with very different structure and functional 
characteristics than the originally discovered GFPs.23 These patents ended 
up in the hands of a patent enforcement company, and resulted in cease-
and-desist letters and lawsuits against a number of companies using 
fluorescent protein technology.24 
For a company like ATUM, the breadth of many DNA-based patents, 
compounded by uncertainties regarding their scope and validity, can pose 
significant problems. A narrower form of intellectual property protection, 
such as might be provided under a copyright regime that recognizes EGC, 
would allow an innovator to garner some protection for a useful 
innovation—like an engineered fluorescent protein—without unduly 
impeding the ability of others to independently develop functional analogs, 
which in some cases might provide different or improved functional 
characteristics. 
In fact, the synthetic biologists at ATUM engineered their own novel 
engineered DNA sequence encoding a fluorescent protein. This synthetic 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2008 
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2008/press.html. 
 23. See Tania Bubela & Robert Cook-Deegan, Keeping Score, Strengthening Policy and 
Fighting Bad Actors over Access to Research Tools, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 143 
(2015); Christopher Holman, Judge Calls Anticancer Inc.’s Attempts to Enforce GFP 
Patents “Misguided,” Warns That Future Enforcement Activity Could Warrant an Award of 
Attorney Fees, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (June 30, 2013), http://holmansbiotechipblog. 
blogspot.com/2013/06/judge-calls-anticancer-incs-attempts-to.html. 
 24. See Bubela & Cook-Deegan, supra note 23. 
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gene, which the company has dubbed “Prancer,” achieves its fluorescence 
by means of a significantly different structural mechanism than original 
GFP-based proteins.25 ATUM does not necessarily require broad patent 
coverage that would preclude others from designing genes with the 
functional characteristics of Prancer, but would understandably like to have 
some legal mechanism to stop competitors from free-riding off its 
investment in time and money. In the absence of some form of IP 
protection, piracy is extremely easy with respect to EGC like the Prancer 
gene, owing to the ready availability of gene synthesis machines and the 
self-replicability of DNA.26 A pirate would not even need to access a single 
copy of the original DNA in order to recreate it - the mere publication of 
the Prancer sequence on the Internet could be used as a basis to cheaply 
make the gene, which could then be easily replicated.27 
ATUM believes that, at least in certain cases, copyright protection for 
synthetic genes like Prancer could provide a more appropriate form of 
protection than patents. A number of commentators have argued that, from 
an innovation policy perspective, copyright is the preferred form of 
protection for software.28 For similar reasons, the same might be the case 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Prancer Purple Protein, ATUM, https://www.atum.bio/eCommerce/catalog/ 
datasheet/41 (last visited May 12, 2017).  
 26. Christopher M. Holman, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.: A Bellwether for the Emerging 
Issue of Patentable Self-Replicating Technologies and Inadvertent Infringement, 80 MO. L. 
REV. 665, 672-73 (2015) [hereinafter Holman, A Bellwether]. 
 27. See id. at 669-72. 
 28. In a recent Federal Circuit opinion, the court noted:  
[S]everal commentators have recently argued [that software is or should be 
entitled to protection only under copyright law—not patent law]. See 
Technology Quarterly, Stalking Trolls, ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21598 321–intellectual–
property–after–being–blamed-stymying-innovation-america-vague (“[M]any 
innovators have argued that the electronics and software industries would 
flourish if companies trying to bring new technology (software innovations 
included) to market did not have to worry about being sued for infringing 
thousands of absurd patents at every turn. A perfectly adequate means of 
protecting and rewarding software developers for their ingenuity has existed for 
over 300 years. It is called copyright.”); Timothy B. Lee, Will the Supreme 
Court save us from software patents?, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2014, 1:13 PM, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/02/26/will-the-
supreme-court-save-us-from-software-patents/ (“If you write a book or a song, 
you can get copyright protection for it. If you invent a new pill or a better 
mousetrap, you can get a patent on it. But for the last two decades, software has 
had the distinction of being potentially eligible for both copyright and patent 
protection. Critics say that's a mistake. They argue that the complex and 
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with respect to some EGC, particularly with advances in synthetic biology 
blurring the line between software engineering and genetic engineering.29 
III. Our Attempt to Register EGC as a Copyrighted Work 
In the spirit of experimentation and “pushing the envelope,” Professor 
Andrew Torrance (University of Kansas School of Law) and I teamed up 
with ATUM in a project wherein we sought copyright registration for the 
Prancer DNA sequence with the U.S. Copyright Office.30 We did this with 
the intent of advancing the public conversation regarding the potential 
applicability of copyright to EGC. Although we fully expected the 
Copyright Office to deny registration, we thought that by appealing such a 
decision it would be possible to get the Copyright Office to explain the 
basis for its position that, while computer code is copyrightable, 
functionally analogous EGC is not. A denial of registration could 
potentially be appealed in the federal courts, if we chose to take the matter 
that far. 
There is some precedent for using copyright registration to expand the 
recognized scope of copyrightable subject matter. For example, in the early 
1960s the Copyright Office expressed “profound doubts” as to whether 
computer programs qualified as copyrightable subject matter.31 A student at 
Columbia University Law School challenged the Copyright Office position 
by filing for registration of a computer program the student had created.32 
In response to this and other requests for registration of computer programs, 
in 1964 the Copyright Office began to permit registration of computer 
programs under a “‘rule of doubt’ . . . leaving the ultimate question of 
copyrightability to the courts.”33 
                                                                                                                 
expensive patent system is a terrible fit for the fast-moving software industry. 
And they argue that patent protection is unnecessary because software 
innovators already have copyright protection available.”). 
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (second alteration in 
original). 
 29. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 421-22. 
 30. Christopher M. Holman, Claes Gustafsson & Andrew W. Torrance, Are Engineered 
Genetic Sequences Copyrightable?: The U.S. Copyright Office Addresses a Matter of First 
Impression, 35 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 103, 103-05 (2016). 
 31. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 692–93. 
 32. See William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: A Failed Experiment and 
a Solution to a Dilemma, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 201-03 (2003). 
 33. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 692, 693. 
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Judicial appeal of a Copyright Office registration denial is one means by 
which the question of copyrightability of EGC could be brought before the 
courts.34 This was the route through which the copyrightability of 
videogame displays, for example, was established. In that case, the 
Copyright Office had repeatedly rejected Sega’s attempts to register the 
videogame BREAKOUT as an audiovisual work, based on the Office’s 
conclusion that “the display screens both individually and as a whole 
simply lack[ ] sufficient creativity to make them registerable as audiovisual 
works.”35 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that the Copyright Office had 
erred by applying an overly stringent standard of creativity, pointing out 
that “[t]he vast majority of works make the [copyright] grade quite 
easily.”36 
Not surprisingly, our request to register Prancer was initially rejected by 
the Office, with no meaningful explanation. In pursuit of a more in-depth 
explanation, we submitted a request for reconsideration (the “Appeal”) on 
November 26, 2012.37 In our request, we argued that human-designed DNA 
sequences such as Prancer fall comfortably within the category of “literary 
work” explicitly specified as copyrightable in the statute for substantially 
the same reasons that computer programs are currently treated as literary 
works eligible for copyright protection.38 Our Appeal explained that, as an 
original work of authorship “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression,” 
the Prancer DNA sequence appears to satisfy the various statutory 
requirements of copyright, particularly given the Copyright Statute’s 
expansive and flexible definition of copyrightable subject matter.39 We also 
emphasized the potential policy benefits that would accompany a 
recognition of copyright protection for engineered genetic code. 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Proline Concrete Tools, Inc. v. Dennis, No. 07CV2310-LAB AJB, 2012 WL 
2886953, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2012), vacated on reconsideration, 2013 WL 12116134 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2013). The other would be a copyright infringement litigation, which 
could be filed even in the absence of registration, so long as the copyright owner at least 
attempted registration. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
 35. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted).  
 36. Id. at 247 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991)). 
 37. DNA 2.0, Inc., Supplementary Document 1: Request for Reconsideration of Denial 
of Copyright Registration of Prancer DNA Sequence, 35 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 113 
(2016). 
 38. Id. at 114-15. 
 39. Id. 
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In February 2014, after more than fourteen months had elapsed, we 
received a letter from the Copyright Office responding to our request for 
reconsideration (the “Denial”).40 The Denial was signed by Robert Kasunic, 
Associate Register of Copyrights and Director of Copyright Policy and 
Practices, and began by apologizing for the delay in responding to our 
request, explaining that “this request was an issue of first impression for the 
U.S. Copyright Office and as such, was given significant consideration 
prior to rendering a decision.”41 The letter goes on to state that “after 
carefully reconsidering the registration materials and the arguments 
contained in your request reconsideration, the Office affirms the refusal 
registration.”42 
The Denial sets forth both policy and legal rationales purporting to 
support the Office’s decision to refuse registration. We could have 
petitioned the Copyright Office a second time to reconsider its refusal to 
register and then proceeded to challenge the decision in the courts, as Sega 
did with respect to videogame displays. After reading the Denial, however, 
we concluded that further appeal to the Copyright Office would almost 
certainly be futile, and an appeal to the courts would require the 
expenditure of more time and money than ATUM was prepared to spend at 
that time. 
We wrote a short article describing in greater detail the result of our 
attempt to register the Prancer DNA sequence, including a detailed 
response that we believe refutes the Office’s stated rationale for denying 
registration.43 Hopefully our efforts have at least helped lay the groundwork 
for future discussion of the potential role of copyright in biotechnology. It 
took many years for the Copyright Office to evolve from its initial position 
of “profound doubt” regarding the copyrightability of software, and there is 
reason to believe that history might repeat itself with respect to EGC. 
IV. Copyright Would Supplement Rather Than Supplant Patent for EGC 
In the Denial, the Office asserted that one reason DNA should not be 
eligible for copyright is that it is already eligible for patent protection. But 
the patentability of EGC should really have no bearing on the question of 
copyrightability. As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently 
                                                                                                                 
 40. DNA 2.0, Inc., Supplementary Document 2: Affirmance of Refusal for Registration, 
35 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 119 (2016). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Holman, Gustafsson & Torrance, supra note 30, at 103-11. 
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and unequivocally reaffirmed in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 
“[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is 
patentable it may not be copyrighted.”44 In Oracle, the Federal Circuit 
specifically addressed the question of whether copyright and patents could 
coexist in the context of software, but the same legal and policy 
considerations would apply to EGC. Patent and copyright could easily play 
complementary and synergistic roles in the protection of EGC, much as 
they currently do with respect to software. In fact, some degree of 
redundancy in intellectual property protection for such an important area of 
technology is desirable, as insurance in the event that one mode of 
protection ultimately proves less robust than was originally thought.  
For example, consider the effect that the recent tightening of the patent 
eligibility standard has had on software patents. For years, prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos,45 the courts had been 
loosening the standard for patent eligibility, and the PTO responded by 
issuing a host of patents directed towards software inventions.46 However, 
since the Court’s recent imposition of a stricter standard, particularly 
through its decision in Alice v. CLS Bank,47 we have seen a parade of 
previously issued software patents invalidated for failure to satisfy the new 
standard.48 As a practical matter, the patent protection that software 
innovators thought they had achieved through patents, and which was the 
basis for investment in companies seeking to commercialize the technology, 
is proving to have been largely illusory. Fortunately, copyright for software 
remains a viable alternative, as was recently affirmed in Oracle, and 
provides at least a baseline level of protection for software developers, even 
as they are stripped of their patents. With respect to biotechnology, recent 
tightening of the patent eligibility requirement threatens to take a similar 
toll, particularly in certain areas, such as diagnostics.49 
                                                                                                                 
 44. 750 F.3d 1339, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)); see Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (“We do hold that the patentability of 
the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not bar copyright as works of art."). 
 45. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 46. Christopher M. Holman, The Mayo Framework Is Bad for Your Health, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 901, 904-06 (2016) [hereinafter Holman, The Mayo Framework]. 
 47. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 48. Holman, The Mayo Framework, supra note 46, at 923-24; see also Robert R. Sachs, 
The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #AliceStorm, BILSKIBLOG (June 20, 2015), 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2015/06/the-one-year-anniversary-the-aftermath-of-alice 
storm.html. 
 49. Holman, The Mayo Framework, supra note 46, at 923-24.  
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Unfortunately, because copyright has yet to be recognized for EGC, 
there is no backup in the event patents are taken away. The primary 
alternative form of intellectual property protection currently available for 
biotechnology is trade secret and, as has been explained elsewhere, there 
are substantial public policy concerns incident to shifting the emphasis of 
intellectual property and biotechnology from patents to trade secrets.50 The 
availability of a viable copyright alternative for EGC could provide an 
important non-trade-secret baseline of protection in the face of continuing 
uncertainty with respect to the viability of patents in the context of 
engineered DNA and biotechnology. 
At this point in the discussion, one might ask why it is that the law has 
developed in a manner such that software innovation is afforded the 
benefits of both copyright and patent protection, but biotechnological 
innovation is not. The answer probably has much to do with historical 
context. At the time copyright was initially opened up to computer 
programs, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was unclear whether patent 
protection would be available for software. In fact, the Supreme Court 
issued two decisions in the 1970s finding the computer programs at issue in 
those cases ineligible for patent protection.51 This was problematic from an 
innovation-policy perspective, since it was widely recognized that some 
form of intellectual property for software innovation would be necessary to 
incentivize optimal innovation.52 With the facial similarity of a transcribed 
computer program and traditional text, policymakers—and ultimately 
Congress and the courts—grasped upon the fiction that a computer program 
is a “literary work,” and essentially enlisted copyright to fill the apparent 
intellectual property void.53 
Soon after the copyrightability of computer programs was established, 
the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Diehr that some computer programs 
are patent eligible,54 and the Federal Circuit followed up with a series of 
decisions espousing a quite permissive standard for the patent eligibility of 
software.55 As a result, both patents and copyright came to play substantial 
and non-redundant roles in protecting innovation in this important area of 
                                                                                                                 
 50. John M. Conley, Robert Cook-Deegan & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Myriad After 
Myriad: The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 597, 600 (2014). 
 51. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
73 (1972). 
 52. See Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 673-74. 
 53. Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 710. 
 54. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981). 
 55. Holman, The Mayo Framework, supra note 46, at 905-06.  
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technology. In a like manner, synthetic biologists might choose to use 
copyright as a supplement to patent protection for some aspects of their 
inventions, thereby filling potential gaps in coverage that might arise when 
patent is the only form of intellectual property available. Alternatively, they 
might choose to rely on copyright in lieu of patent, thereby obviating some 
of the policy concerns associated with the patenting of genetic sequences in 
a manner that better facilitates open access and follow-on innovation.56 
Many of the advantages that flow from using copyright to protect software 
would also apply to EGC, as discussed in more detail below.57 
There are those who argue that EGC does not meet the statutory 
requirements for copyrightability.58 But it is important to recognize that 
essentially the same arguments have long been raised with respect to 
copyright for software, although in recent years it has become much less 
controversial. While today it is well settled that a computer program can be 
copyrighted as a “literary work,”59 for years many experts in copyright law 
bridled at the suggestion.60 Even after the copyrightability of software was 
generally accepted, courts struggled when applying judicial precedent, 
which has historically focused on the protection of aesthetic works, to 
functional computer programs.61 Today, copyright protection for software 
is thoroughly entrenched, and it would be extremely difficult to retreat, 
particularly in view of the fact that Article 10 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) provides that 
“[c]omputer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected 
as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).”62 Nonetheless, as 
pointed out by the U.S. Solicitor General in an amicus brief recently filed 
with the Supreme Court recommending denial of certiorari in the case of 
Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc., the Supreme Court has yet to address 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See Ledford, supra note 10, at 17.  
 57. See infra Part VI. 
 58. Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 704-05 (collecting sources). 
 59. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C][2] 
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 60. Samuelson, supra note 31, at 665-71; see also Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case 
for Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131, 1143-44 
(1986).  
 61. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling 
a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit.”). 
 62. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, pt. II, 
§ 1, art. 10.1 (Apr. 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].  
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the application of copyright principles to computer programs, and so the 
exact contours of the protection are not entirely without ambiguity, 
particularly given certain splits between the various circuits.63 
In applying copyright law and legal precedent to EGC, the close analogy 
between software and EGC is likely to prove invaluable. Many of the 
fundamental questions regarding the scope of copyright protection available 
to EGC, such as the degree of substantial similarity required to show non-
literal infringement, the proper application of the idea/expression 
dichotomy, and related concepts such as merger, to name but a few, have 
already been addressed in numerous judicial decisions involving computer 
code.64 These decisions often explicitly acknowledge that the traditional 
doctrines are used as policy levers, and that, particularly with respect to 
functional copyrighted works like software (and EGC would also fall within 
this category), it is extremely important to interpret long-standing doctrine 
in a manner that furthers innovation policy, recognizing that much of the 
precedent originated in cases involving primarily aesthetic works that do 
not implicate the same policy concerns.65 
Fortunately, the law has a long and well-established tradition of using 
analogy as a primary mechanism for adapting to the development of new 
technologies that warrant copyright protection, and for doing so in a manner 
that remains cognizant of the overriding policy objectives underlying 
copyright law. Professor Nimmer has observed, for example, that  
[a]s to new forms of creative expression that may emerge in the 
future as a result of scientific discoveries or technological 
developments . . . [i]f such a new form is sufficiently analogous 
to the kinds of works that are expressly protected in the eight 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Google, Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2887 (2016) (No. 14-410) (Mem.), 2015 WL 2457656 at *19-*23; see also Apple 
Compt., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (“We believe 
that in the context before us, a program for an operating system, the line [between idea and 
expression] must be a pragmatic one, which also keeps in consideration 'the preservation of 
the balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright 
laws.'”); Comput. Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992) (“We are 
satisfied that the three step approach we have just outlined not only comports with, but 
advances the constitutional policies underlying the Copyright Act. Since any method that 
tries to distinguish idea from expression ultimately impacts on the scope of copyright 
protection afforded to a particular type of work, 'the line [it draws] must be a pragmatic one, 
which also keeps in consideration "the preservation of the balance between competition and 
protection . . . ."’” (alteration in original) (quoting Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1253)). 
 64. See infra Part VI. 
 65. See infra Part VI. 
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categories, it will be regarded as falling within “the present 
congressional intent,” even though the similarity is only by 
analogy.66  
Similarly, Professor Goldstein correctly observes in his treatise that  
the question will sometimes arise whether a new form of 
authorship, not expressly mentioned in the Act, is entitled to 
protection. The most practical and principled approach to this 
section is to reason by analogy to works expressly listed in 
section 102. . . . [N]ew forms of works should be protected if 
they are similar to those listed and not protected if they are 
dissimilar.67 
V. Desired Policy Attributes of a Copyright Regime Encompassing EGC 
In a 1988 article, Professor Dan Burk concluded that while EGC would 
probably qualify for copyright protection, at least as a matter of legal 
doctrine, such an extension should only occur if it would further public 
policy objectives.68 He opined that, at the time when he wrote that article, 
which was relatively early in the biotechnology revolution, policy 
considerations did not seem to support the extension of copyright protection 
to genetic sequences, and for that reason he suggested that society refrain 
from going down that path.69 
I agree that extending copyright to EGC should only be pursued if it 
makes sense as a matter of policy, but I would argue that, in fact, 
compelling policy objectives might be furthered by extending copyright to 
genetic sequences, and I believe the proposal warrants serious 
consideration. Of course, opinions will vary with respect to exactly what 
constitutes optimal innovation policy. Some would be in favor of very 
narrow and limited scope of protection, for example, whereas others would 
favor more robust rights. Ideally, copyright for engineered DNA would 
provide some baseline of protection that supplements and complements 
patent protection, but does not supplant it, just as patent and copyright exist 
side-by-side in the context of software. 
The first policy issue to address concerns the manner in which copyright 
should treat human genes and other naturally occurring DNA sequences. I 
                                                                                                                 
 66. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 59, § 2.03[A]. 
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have found that when I initially broach the idea of copyright for EGC to 
someone who has not previously given the idea much thought (most 
copyright scholars, for example), the initial response is typically an 
objection based on the idea that no one should be able to “own” another 
person’s genes or, for that matter, genetic information in general. Indeed, a 
widespread resistance to the idea of property rights in human genes and 
genetic materials appears to have been a primary driver in the Supreme 
Court’s decision to take the Myriad case and would likely be an obstacle in 
any move to extend copyright to DNA.70 
A consensus position on optimal innovation policy would likely impose 
some sort of requirement that, in order to be copyrightable, a synthetic 
sequence must incorporate some non-trivial degree of variation relative to 
the closest naturally occurring counterpart. Thus, for example, the 
introduction of a very slight modification to a naturally occurring DNA 
sequence should generally not be sufficient to render that sequence 
copyrightable. In fact, some might argue that a relatively substantial degree 
of difference should be required as a prerequisite to copyright protection. In 
Myriad, the Supreme Court recently suggested that in order to be patent-
eligible a chemical compound must be “markedly different” from any 
naturally occurring counterpart.71 The “markedly different” standard was 
subsequently incorporated into PTO guidance on patent subject-matter 
eligibility.72 
There are many dimensions in which an EGC can differ from a naturally 
occurring counterpart upon which it might be based. For example, due to 
the redundancy of the genetic code, a sequence encoding a native protein 
can be altered at the nucleotide level to generate an EGC that still codes for 
the identical protein sequence.73 From a policy perspective, a single 
nucleotide alteration that results in a synonymous DNA sequence of this 
sort might be considered creatively insufficient to warrant copyright 
protection. On the other hand, multiple alterations, perhaps incorporated 
into the sequence in order to optimize codon usage for improved expression 
in a recombinant host, could be characterized as the sort of substantial and 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See The Fight to Take Back Our Genes, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/feature/fight-
take-back-our-genes (last visited May 12, 2017). 
 71. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 
(2013). 
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creative departure from nature that would warrant protection.74 
Alternatively, nucleotide alterations might be introduced that change the 
amino acid sequence of the encoded protein, which could result in 
functional differences ranging from subtle to extreme.75 Possible 
permutations on these ideas are virtually infinite, but suffice it to say that 
optimized innovation policy might warrant the institution of a threshold for 
copyrightability that requires some substantial degree of divergence from 
the corresponding native sequence. 
Synthetic biology encompasses not only engineered genes, but also 
engineered genetic systems, including engineered recombinations of genes 
and other genetic elements.76 The individual genes and genetic elements, 
which can include promoters, enhancers, and other regulators of gene 
expression, can be thought of as modules.77 Much like a software engineer 
can create new software by recombining modules of code, a genetic 
engineer can recombine genetic modules to achieve a desired outcome in an 
engineered biological system.78 In either case, the modules themselves 
might already exist, but the creative reorganization and integration of 
preexisting modules can nonetheless represent a significant feat of 
engineering. Stanford University’s Christina Smolke recently reported her 
laboratory’s successful creation of a synthetic twenty-three-gene, opioid-
synthesis pathway in a bacteria, and with advances in synthetic biology, 
even more complex synthetic genetic systems are surely on the horizon.79 
The engineering of genetic modules can be quite simple - the earliest 
feats of genetic engineering, for example, typically involved the 
introduction of a single, cloned gene into a recombinant plasmid.80 But with 
advances in synthetic biology, the rearrangement of genetic elements is 
becoming quite complex, and is resulting in synthetic biology products that 
comprise a large number of interacting modules designed to achieve a 
complex result.81 The Smolke group’s introduction of a new metabolic 
                                                                                                                 
 74. For example, this technique is used in codon optimization. See generally Natalie J. 
Ward et al., Codon Optimization of Human Factor VIII cDNAs Leads to High-Level 
Expression, 117 BLOOD J. 798 (2011).  
 75. Holman, Debunking, supra note 20, at 242. 
 76. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 419-22. 
 77. See id. at 438-39. 
 78. Id. at 421. 
 79. Stephanie Galanie et al., Complete Biosynthesis of Opioids in Yeast, 349 SCIENCE 
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pathway into an engineered microorganism is a good example.82 Optimal 
innovation policy could dictate some substantial threshold of complexity 
and creativity in the reordering of existing genetic modules as a prerequisite 
to copyright protection. 
To the extent possible, copyright for EGC should provide the necessary 
scope of coverage to incentivize innovation without unduly impeding 
subsequent research and innovation by others.83 Copyright protection that 
would prevent outright pirating, i.e., the direct appropriation of the identical 
DNA sequence, would be highly desirable, particularly as it is becoming 
increasingly cheap and easy to generate an unlimited number of exact 
copies of a DNA sequence. Replication of EGC embodied in a seed can be 
particularly easy - in some cases requiring nothing more than soil, water, 
and sunlight.84 Access to engineered DNA is no longer required for 
copying, since a genetic sequence published online can readily be converted 
into the equivalent DNA molecule, and then used to produce additional 
copies ad infinitum.85 Furthermore, some reasonable scope of protection 
would be desirable in order to deter an unscrupulous copyist from skirting 
infringement by simply introducing a few minor changes to a copyrighted 
DNA sequence.86 At the same time, many would argue that the protection 
should be tailored so as not to unduly preclude others from independently 
creating EGC that provides substantially similar functionality. 
If copyright is extended to EGC, it should be done in a manner that 
minimizes the threat of liability for primarily non-commercial actors, such 
as academic researchers, educators and their students, and synthetic biology 
hobbyists (i.e., DIY synthetic biologists). Patent law has a very limited 
exemption for research use, and this lack of an explicit safe harbor for 
research is a focal point of criticism of the patent system.87 An optimized 
copyright regime for EGC might provide a relatively broad exemption for a 
wide variety of research, facilitating follow-on innovation while at the same 
time addressing the concerns of critics. 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See generally Galanie et al., supra note 79 (describing process). 
 83. See Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 458-62; see also Heidi Williams, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the Human Genome, 121 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 24-25 (2013). 
 84. Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 669-70.  
 85. Id.  
 86. See id.  
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In the realm of software, the open-source-software movement has 
leveraged copyright protection to promote sharing and public accessibility 
of software code in a manner that facilitates collaborative innovation.88 For 
years there has been a significant and growing interest in developing an 
open-source alternative for biotechnology.89 Given the increasing 
convergence of software design and biotechnology, particularly in the realm 
of synthetic biology, it is not surprising that biotechnologists yearn for the 
perceived benefits of open source. Unfortunately, although there have been 
earnest attempts at open-source biotechnology, up to this point we have not 
seen a truly workable model that compares with what exists for software.90 
Optimally, a copyright regime encompassing EGC would facilitate the 
development of a pragmatically viable open-source alternative for 
biotechnology. 
Interoperability is often a critical consideration in software design and 
development, and has been defined as the “[a]bility of a computer system to 
run application programs from different vendors, and to interact with other 
computers across local or wide-area networks regardless of their physical 
architecture and operating systems.”91 Similarly, there has been an 
increasing recognition of a need for interoperability in synthetic biology.92 
A copyright regime that facilitates interoperability should be considered as 
an important policy objective. 
Synthetic biologists complain that patents can be prohibitively expensive 
to acquire and that they can take too long to issue, particularly for a fast-
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moving company like ATUM.93 Compounding the problem is the 
uncertainty regarding the scope of patentable subject matter, exacerbated by 
recent Supreme Court decisions such as Mayo and Myriad. The long-time 
lag between applying for a patent and issuance of a patent was not such a 
problem for the original products of biotechnology— pharmaceuticals and 
genetically engineered agricultural products—because these products took 
many years to bring to market, largely due to stringent regulatory 
requirements.94 With advances in synthetic biology, however, the 
commercialization of new synthetic biology innovations can occur quite 
rapidly, often on a time scale much shorter than the time necessary to obtain 
a patent.95 Furthermore, the exploding number of engineered genetic 
sequences being developed is rendering it prohibitively expensive to seek 
patent protection for each one individually.96 The democratization of 
synthetic biology, including the DIY-synthetic-biology movement, will 
likely contribute to a demand for intellectual property protection that is 
easier and less expensive to obtain than patent protection, and copyright 
could be particularly advantageous in this regard.97 Thus, an optimal 
copyright regime will provide a much quicker, less expensive, and easier 
form of intellectual property relative to patents. 
It would also be desirable to have a form of intellectual property 
available for engineered DNA that would promote early public disclosure. 
Because of the time and money necessary to file for a patent and the 
problems associated with public disclosure prior to securing patent 
protection, the patent regime fosters an environment that can incentivize 
inventors to delay disclosure.98 The recent heightening of the requirements 
of patent eligibility and the attendant uncertainty as to whether patent 
protection will be available for many gene-based inventions are reportedly 
pushing some companies toward maintaining genetic sequence information 
as a trade secret.99 A copyright regime that provides a reasonable baseline 
level of protection at an early stage could promote more public disclosure, 
which many would see as a desired policy objective. 
Ideally, copyright for EGC would provide effective protection not only 
for the code itself, but also for the commercial products utilizing the EGC. 
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First and foremost, an effective copyright regime would provide the ability 
to protect genetically modified seeds. So far, patents have proven 
reasonably effective in protecting the genetically modified crops developed 
by companies such as Monsanto and DuPont, but there are significant 
limitations in the effectiveness of using patents in this regard.100 Genetically 
engineered seeds raise concerns about misappropriation and free-riding 
similar to those raised by software and digitally recorded music, in that it is 
extremely easy for end-users of these technologies to reproduce and 
distribute a virtually unlimited number of identical copies.101 In the case of 
software and digitally recorded music, reproduction and distribution occurs 
on the computer and over the Internet, whereas with respect to agriculture it 
occurs in a farmer’s fields, but the underlying policy concerns are the same. 
While today genetically modified seeds are the form of biotechnological 
innovation with the most problematic potential for replication by end-users, 
in the future, a host of other non-agricultural synthetic biology products 
will, in all likelihood, raise similar concerns.102 Thus, it is important that 
any copyright regime that develops for EGC can be effectively leveraged to 
protect self-replicating synthetic biology products from misappropriation, 
including, but not limited to, seeds. 
The practical enforceability of copyright will likewise be an important 
consideration. A copyright regime encompassing EGC will optimally be 
structured in a manner that renders enforcement against infringers more 
efficient and/or provides more effective remedies. 
Ideally, copyright for EGC will avoid the problem of potential 
inadvertent infringement, an issue that came to the forefront a few years 
ago when the Supreme Court decided Bowman v. Monsanto Co.103 The 
defendant, Vernon Bowman, was a farmer who argued that sale of a 
patented seed should exhaust all patent rights in second-generation seeds.104 
Supporters of Bowman argued that without patent exhaustion, farmers 
faced the threat of virtually unavoidable liability for inadvertent 
infringement caused, for example, by second-generation seeds blown from 
another field or purchased from a seed vendor.105 The Supreme Court 
rejected Bowman’s argument in this particular case, finding that Bowman’s 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See generally Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26 (discussing patent protection for 
genetically modified seeds). 
 101. Id. at 669-670, 674, 678. 
 102. Holman, Developments, supra note 2, at 451-53. 
 103. 133 S. Ct. 1761, 2768-69 (2013). 
 104. Id. at 1766.  
 105. See id. at 1768-69; Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 684-86. 
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actions were knowing and purposeful and thus the antithesis of 
inadvertent.106 The Court did recognize, however, that inadvertent 
infringement could constitute a substantial policy concerns, and it left the 
door open to address those concerns in a later case presenting such facts.107 
The potential for inadvertent infringement is a general concern with respect 
to many DNA-based inventions, such as recombinant seeds, and a copyright 
regime for EGC would optimally be structured in a manner that would 
shield truly inadvertent infringers from liability.108 
Many would also argue that copyright should provide some form of safe 
harbor from liability for certain entities involved in the production of 
engineered DNA. For example, companies such as ATUM that provide 
DNA synthesis as a service for customers are currently not in a good 
position to confirm whether a sequence ordered by a customer could 
potentially result in charges of patent infringement.109 Similarly, non-profits 
like Biobricks are hesitant to provide DNA components to commercial 
entities for fear of patent infringement liability.110 Ideally, a copyright 
regime for engineered DNA would be structured such that it facilitates 
relatively painless freedom-to-operate clearance, and/or provides some 
form of protection from liability for third-party contractors and other 
intermediaries with respect to which an imposition of liability would create 
public policy concerns. 
Finally, one of the arguments that is most often raised against extending 
copyright to EGC is the duration of the copyright term. Many would argue 
that the patent term is already too long, at least for the purposes of synthetic 
biology, and worry about creating a new form of intellectual property 
protection that lasts much longer than a patent. If these concerns regarding 
the long duration of copyright could be addressed, it seems likely that much 
of the opposition to the use of copyright in biotechnology would dissipate. 
VI. Applying Copyright Doctrine to EGC as a Policy Lever 
Ideally, copyright should treat EGC in a manner that provides the 
optimal degree of protection while preventing overprotection that could 
effectively tie up the building blocks of future innovation. This Part VI 
considers how some of the established features of copyright law could be 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1769.  
 107. See id.  
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 109. See supra Part II. 
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interpreted and applied as policy levers to achieve some of the desired 
policy objectives outlined above.  
A. Copyright Duration 
In a previous article, I explained that many of the arguments raised 
against copyright for EGC are based on fundamental misunderstandings of 
copyright law and/or the nature of EGC.111 One of the objections that I have 
heard voiced repeatedly, however, is legitimate: Copyright simply lasts too 
long - sometimes more than a century, depending on factors such as 
lifespan of the author.112 There are those who believe that even the much 
shorter patent term is too long for biotechnology and that the last thing we 
need is a thicket of copyrights constraining the freedom of operation for 
future generations of synthetic biologists. One might also argue that the 
long duration of copyright is gratuitous and not necessary to incentivize the 
creation of new EGCs. 
My response to this concern is three-fold. First, I agree that the duration 
of copyright is probably longer than necessary for EGC (and also, by the 
way, for computer programs for much the same reasons), and it might make 
sense for Congress to consider enacting a subject-matter-specific reduction 
in duration for copyright covering EGC or even copyright in general. 
Second, short of reducing the copyright term, Congress could, and probably 
should, consider statutory reforms that would address some of the 
underlying concerns associated with the duration of the copyright term. 
Third, and perhaps most crucial, it is important to recognize that the long 
copyright term is already in force with respect to computer software and 
does not appear to have created substantial impediments to follow-on 
innovation in that technological space. There is no reason to think it will be 
any more problematic in the context of EGC. 
1. Reduction of Copyright Duration 
Although some argue that the current copyright term is too long and 
should be reduced, as a practical matter this seems unlikely, at least in the 
near term, in part because of international treaty obligations.113 A subject-
                                                                                                                 
 111. Holman, Copyright, supra note 7, at 722, 730. 
 112. Ledford, supra note 10, at 17 (noting that Stanford Professor Drew Endy “worries 
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matter-specific reduction in copyright term, however, might be more 
feasible and worth consideration. There would be some precedent for this 
approach. Many countries already afford a shorter term of protection to 
sound recordings, and it has been suggested that the United States should 
adopt a similar approach.114 The Copyright Statute provides sui generis 
forms of copyright-like protection for semiconductor chips and boat hulls, 
and the duration of these protections is only ten years.115 Along similar 
lines, Congress has also considered copyright-like protection for fashion 
designs, which would have a very short duration, but this protection has yet 
to be enacted.116 
Thus, it would not be entirely out of the question to address the duration 
concern by congressional action, either by specifically shortening the 
duration of copyright for EGC or, perhaps, by creating sui generis 
copyright-like protection for EGC. At least one commentator has advocated 
for an extension of sui generis copyright-like protection to EGC (as well as 
software and nanotechnology).117 If a sui generis approach is taken, it could 
provide more flexibility to address other concerns that have been expressed 
with regard to extending copyright to engineered DNA. Any sui generis 
protection should ideally incorporate the beneficial features of copyright as 
identified in this article. The duration of protection for EGC should be 
tailored to meet the needs of the synthetic biology community and likely 
would be substantially longer than the short period that is being 
contemplated for fashion design, for example. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 114. Tim Brooks, Only in America: The Unique Status of Sound Recordings Under U.S. 
Copyright Law and How It Threatens Our Audio Heritage, 27 AM. MUSIC 125, 128 (2009) 
(“All countries except the United States recognize that recordings are derivative works and 
accord them shorter terms of protection than for the music or text they embody.”). 
 115. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 § 302, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (2012); 
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act § 502, 17 U.S.C. § 1301-32 (2012) (boat hull designs 
receive protection upon registration with the Copyright Office with the protection lasting for 
ten years after registration). 
 116. The Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009), and the 
Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010), 
would have provided three years of protection for fashion designs.  
 117. See Dennis S. Karjala, Protecting Innovation in Computer Software, Biotechnology, 
and Nanotechnology 31 (Mar. 12, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://works.bepress. 
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2. Statutory Reforms Addressing Underlying Concerns 
Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute in a manner that renders 
the long duration of copyright less objectionable. For example, some 
commentators have suggested that the long duration of copyright 
exacerbates the so-called “orphan works” problem, but there are avenues 
for attenuating these concerns that do not require any modification of the 
copyright term.118 A group calling itself the Copyright Principles Project 
(“CPP”) recently suggested that problems associated with the long duration 
of copyright could be addressed by re-formalizing copyright law, and in 
particular by creating stronger incentives for copyright registration, thereby 
making it easier for follow-on creators to identify the owners of 
copyrighted works and to seek permission to use the work.119 The CPP’s 
proposed incentives for registration include ideas such as providing broader 
scope of fair use for unregistered works, denying protection against non-
literal copying to unregistered works (while maintaining the right for the 
owner of an unregistered work to sue for literal copying), and broader 
exemptions for non-commercial use of an unregistered work.120 These 
proposals could be adopted for copyright law in general or more 
specifically for EGC in order to address concerns associated with this 
proposed new category of copyrighted work. 
The CPP also proposed expanding the use of private registry regimes to 
better enable follow-on creators to identify and seek licenses from rights 
owners.121 The private registries envisioned by the CPP, which would be 
analogous to existing rights management organizations such as ASCAP, 
BMI, and the Copyright Clearance Center, could go a long way in 
addressing concerns associated with long duration of copyright.122 A private 
registry could be particularly helpful in the case of EGC, because although 
the Copyright Office currently has no expertise in biotechnology or genetic 
                                                                                                                 
 118. David R. Hansen et al., Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 
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sequences, there are a variety of private firms that have advanced 
capabilities for cataloging and searching genetic sequences.123 Other 
governmental agencies, such as the PTO, which has years of experience 
dealing with property rights in genetic sequences, might also assist in 
registration and providing public notice of the existence of copyright in a 
particular EGC sequence. As the CPP noted, commercial databases 
operated by private entities such as Corbis and Getty have been established 
to facilitate rights clearance in the context of photographs,124 and private 
prophylactics against orphan-work problems in the context of EGC would 
no doubt arise once there is sufficient demand. 
The Copyright Office issued a report recommending that Congress 
address orphan works by providing a defense for those who, after diligent 
search, are unable to identify the owner of a work and who then proceed to 
incorporate that work into their own.125 If Congress were to adopt such an 
approach, it could mitigate much of the potential negative impact of EGC 
copyright on follow-on innovation. 
The CCP also suggested that Congress create a statutory provision that 
would facilitate the ability of authors to dedicate their works to the public 
domain.126 This could be a particularly attractive option for EGC. In fact, it 
could become the norm for academic researchers, and many companies, 
such as ATUM, would likely find that it makes commercial sense to 
dedicate at least some of their EGC to the public domain. Publicly funded 
institutions, such as the National Institutes of Health, could even make this 
a requirement for funding or treat it as a favorable factor when considering 
approval of a grant application. 
3. Copyright Generally Creates Narrower Rights Than Patent 
When people voice concern about the long duration of copyright and 
worry about the effect of EGC copyright on subsequent innovation, they 
often seem to be equating copyright with the much broader rights 
associated with patents. For a variety of reasons, copyright is a much 
narrower form of protection with much less potential to negatively impact 
follow-on innovation. This probably goes a long way in explaining why the 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See, e.g., GQ LIFE SCI., https://www.gqlifesciences.com/(last visited May 12, 2017). 
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long copyright term has not proven particularly problematic with respect to 
follow-on innovation in software. As discussed later in this article, for 
example, copyright should not prevent others from designing alternative 
EGC to carry out identical functions.127 To help alleviate concerns, 
independent creation should never constitute copyright infringement, and 
naturally occurring DNA sequences and EGC that is substantially similar to 
naturally occurring DNA sequences should not be copyrightable.128 
Furthermore, the legal availability of fair use and other limitations on 
copyright similarly should ameliorate many of the objections premised 
upon the long duration of copyright.129 
B. The Requirements of Copyrightability 
Extending copyright to EGC does not imply that all EGC would be 
copyrighted. There are a variety of requirements of copyrightability that 
would preclude copyright protection for a subset of EGC; genetic sequences 
that too closely resemble naturally occurring genetic sequences, for 
example, may be excluded. These requirements of copyrightability could be 
interpreted and applied in the context of EGC in a manner designed to 
further public policy. As explained in this Part VI, the courts have 
repeatedly interpreted the doctrines of copyrightability in the context of 
software in a manner designed to achieve certain policy objectives 
associated with software innovation and, given the close analogy between 
EGC and computer code, these decisions could provide useful precedent in 
charting the course for a policy-driven interpretation of copyright doctrine 
in the context of EGC. 
1. The Originality Threshold 
As set forth by the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Services Co., the threshold requirement for copyrightability is 
“originality.”130 In order to meet the threshold, a work must have been 
“independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works)” and must “possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.”131 
Both prongs of the Feist test could provide meaningful restrictions on the 
scope of copyright protection available to EGC, requiring a certain degree 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See infra Section VI.C.2. 
 128. See infra Section VI.B.4. 
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of creativity and effectively excluding sequences that come too close to a 
naturally occurring genetic sequence. 
Of particular relevance in the context of DNA, the independent-creation 
requirement could be leveraged to effectively preclude copyright protection 
for any DNA sequence derived from a natural source. As discussed above, 
many of the objections raised with respect to extending copyright to DNA 
have focused on concerns that it would create property rights over human 
genes and other naturally occurring genetic material.132 A strictly construed 
requirement of originality would address these concerns. 
On the other hand, EGC should often be found to satisfy an independent-
creation test, perhaps even in cases where it is quite similar to a naturally 
occurring genetic sequence. The Supreme Court recognized the creativity of 
genetic engineering in Myriad, noting that the “lab technician 
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA [“synthetically created” 
DNA] is made.”133 The fact that a synthetic biologist uses information 
about a naturally occurring sequence as the raw material in the creation of 
an original engineered genetic sequence should no more be a bar to 
copyright protection than would be the incorporation of knowledge gleaned 
from the natural world into a computer program. For that matter, a book 
based on historical facts can be copyrighted, even though the historical facts 
themselves were not created by the author. Likewise, a sculptor does not 
forfeit copyright protection by using naturally occurring wood or stone as 
his starting material. It makes little sense to suggest that a work cannot 
receive copyright protection simply because it is based to some extent on a 
product of nature, so long as it meets the modicum-of-creativity standard 
required under Feist. 
The modicum-of-creativity prong of the Feist test134 could draw the line 
between unprotectable natural sequences and copyrightable engineered 
sequences and thereby serve as a policy lever to further innovation policy. 
For example, it could be used to set a certain minimal requirement of 
divergence from nature by requiring as a prerequisite for copyright that an 
engineered DNA sequence incorporate a substantial departure from any 
corresponding natural sequence. This would mirror the PTO’s current 
standard for patent eligibility of DNA sequences dictated by Myriad, 
pursuant to which a DNA sequence must be “markedly different” from a 
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(2013). 
 134. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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naturally occurring counterpart in order to constitute patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.135 
In fact, the extent to which EGC must diverge from nature in order to 
satisfy the modicum-of-creativity standard could actually be higher than the 
standard for patent eligibility set forth in Myriad. In Myriad, the Court held 
that BRCA cDNA is different enough from its natural counterpart to be 
patent-eligible, in spite of the fact that a cDNA sequence is extremely 
similar in both function and structure to the mRNA molecule on which it is 
based.136 The cDNA embodies the same information as the corresponding 
mRNA, and there is really no creativity, at least in the literal sense, 
involved in converting naturally occurring mRNA into cDNA.137 In my 
view, cDNA would generally not satisfy the originality requirement of 
copyright, even though the Supreme Court has deemed it patentable. 
The requirement of creativity has, on occasion, been invoked to deny 
copyright protection to conventional literary works, creating precedent for 
courts to take an analogous approach when faced with an insufficiently 
creative EGC. In Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Service, for 
example, a “common legal form” was declared uncopyrightable, based on 
the court’s finding that “[t]he plaintiff did no original legal research which 
resulted in a significant addition to the standard conventional sales contract 
or chattel mortgage forms; he merely made trivial word changes by 
combining various forms and servilely imitating the already stereotyped 
language found therein.”138 In contrast, courts have found more elaborate 
blank forms evidencing greater creativity to meet the threshold.139 In Edwin 
K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, for example, the court 
found the relatively more complex forms at issue in that case “constituted 
an integrated work entitled to copyright protection.”140 Similarly, in 
Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., the court found an “Executive 
Planner” copyrightable as a compilation, distinguishing earlier cases that 
had found similar products uncopyrightable because “[n]one of the works 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117, 2119.  
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involved in those cases approached sophistication and complexity of format 
and arrangement involved here.”141 
As a general matter, the recombination of naturally occurring DNA 
sequences should be found to constitute a work deserving of copyright 
protection, but the requirement of creativity could be leveraged to ensure 
that a copyrightable design reflects some threshold level of creativity. For 
example, a very straightforward and routine operation—like splicing a 
commonly used promoter with a protein-encoding gene sequence—should 
probably be considered insufficiently creative to meet the standard. 
It is well established that copyrightable expression can arise solely from 
the creative selection and arrangement of otherwise uncopyrightable 
elements. For example, in Feist, the Supreme Court held that the selection 
and arrangement of facts can be copyrightable, so long as the selection and 
arrangement evidences the necessary modicum of creativity.142 
Analogously, a creative selection and arrangement of naturally occurring 
genetic sequences in an engineered construct should be sufficient to warrant 
copyright protection for the construct. Significantly, the protection would 
not extend to the underlying facts, i.e., the naturally occurring sequence 
elements, and the selection and arrangement of the components would have 
to satisfy some minimal threshold of creativity.143 
On the other hand, an insufficiently creative selection and arrangement 
of naturally occurring genetic sequences should be found to lack the 
necessary modicum of creativity to receive protection. Note, however, that 
the amount of creativity required under Feist has generally been interpreted 
as minimal144 and, if the same standard is applied to EGC, many works 
involving the selection and arrangement of preexisting genetic elements 
would be deemed copyrightable, given the large and growing number of 
genetic sequences available for recombination. For example, a cDNA 
sequence corresponding exactly to a naturally occurring mRNA probably 
lacks the necessary creativity, but incorporating that cDNA sequence into a 
plasmid would probably involve sufficient creativity of expression, given 
that there are a large number of plasmids from which to choose and 
different locations and orientations in which the cDNA could be introduced 
into the plasmid. In the context of software, a novel arrangement of 
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modules providing structure for a software program has been found to 
satisfy the creativity standard for originality.145  
Of course, courts could ratchet up the modicum-of-creativity standard for 
EGC in furtherance of innovation policy. 
One might argue that since the design of EGC is informed and guided in 
large part by the cumulative knowledge of the relationship between 
biological sequence and function, gleaned from observation of naturally 
occurring genetic sequences, these engineered sequences should generally 
fail the modicum-of-creativity test. But many works currently recognized as 
copyrightable, such as books describing natural phenomena or computer 
software incorporating fundamental principles of math and science, are 
based in part upon the observation of the natural world and naturally 
occurring phenomena, yet no one seriously suggests that the incorporation 
of this sort of knowledge renders the product uncopyrightable. Engineered 
genetic sequences are products of the design and intent of the creator, and 
the fact that starting materials and design principles are based in large part 
on the observation of naturally occurring sequences should not, as a general 
matter, render these products of creativity uncopyrightable. 
The principle that copyright is not necessarily precluded for creative 
works that are based upon, or even highly similar to, uncopyrightable works 
of nature is illustrated by a recent district court decision overturning a 
Copyright Office decision to deny registration of “rock and stone sculptures 
that are used to make decorative concrete stamps.”146 The Office’s decision 
that these man-made sculptures are not copyrightable was based on its 
improper conclusion that the sculptures were mere “slavish copies of 
uncopyrightable objects and, as such, do not contain a sufficient amount of 
original authorship to support copyright claims.”147 In particular, the Office 
“opined that the works are slavish copies because they just replicate natural 
stones and their features.”148 Although no one would dispute that naturally 
occurring stones and rocks are not copyrightable, the court pointed out that 
the sculptures at issue in this case “are not molds of existing stones or 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 
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rocks. They are created from the artists [sic] interpretation of stones and 
rocks he has observed.”149 The court criticized the Office’s decision not to 
register the stone sculptures, noting that it seemed “to result from its 
confusion over how [the registrant] creates the sculptures and what exactly 
it seeks to copyright.”150 
For essentially the same reason, the Copyright Office’s current position 
that EGC is not copyrightable because it is based on naturally occurring 
genetic sequences suggests that the Copyright Office is confused as to this 
distinction between naturally occurring genetic code and engineered genetic 
code. Perhaps the only relevant difference between EGC and the sculptures 
in Proline is that the question of copyright for EGC has yet to make it to the 
courts. 
Some judicial opinions seem to suggest that a heightened requirement of 
creativity exists with respect to derivative works, as compared to truly 
original works.151 A recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 
Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington Mills, Inc., is particularly on point.152 In 
Home Legend, an alleged copyright infringer brought an action against the 
copyright owner seeking a declaratory judgment that its copyright for a 
laminate-flooring design was invalid because the flooring design was 
nothing more than a “slavish copy of nature.”153 The court rejected this 
argument for reasons similar to those of the court in Proline, holding that 
the flooring design was not a slavish copy of nature, but rather the 
expression of a sufficiently creative idea to be protectable by copyright.154 
The court did, however, go on to characterize the flooring design as a 
derivative work, given that its design “reflects the uncopyrightable features 
of each plank—features like the shape of the natural underlying wood grain 
and the plank's shape, both of which are in the public domain.”155 As a 
derivative work, the court held that the laminated flooring design was 
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 150. Id. at *3. 
 151. See, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983). But see 
Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Gracen said that 
‘a derivative work must be substantially different from the underlying work to be 
copyrightable.’ This statement should not be understood to require a heightened standard of 
originality for copyright in a derivative work.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 152. 784 F.3d 1404, 1414 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Warren Publ'g, Inc. v. Microdos Data 
Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1515 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A creative work is entitled to the most 
protection, followed by a derivative work, and finally by a compilation.”)). 
 153. Id. at 1410. 
 154. Id. at 1414.  
 155. Id. 
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eligible for only relatively narrow copyright protection, limited to “identical 
and near-identical copies.”156 
Similarly, an engineered DNA sequence that is based on a naturally 
occurring DNA sequence could be plausibly characterized as derivative of 
the native sequence and, hence, potentially subject to a heightened 
requirement of creativity. Even if this requirement is satisfied, derivation 
from a naturally occurring sequence could result in narrow coverage limited 
to identical or near-identical sequences. This approach could serve a policy 
objective of increasing the minimum creativity threshold for engineered 
DNA, thereby excluding from copyright protection DNA sequences lacking 
some requisite degree of creativity and providing only narrow protection for 
minimally creative sequences. On the other hand, the more EGC departs 
from nature and other public domain genetic sequences, the more it should 
be afforded the more robust protection generally available for copyrighted 
works. 
2. Fixation in a Tangible Medium 
Unlike patent protection, which must be specifically applied for and 
granted by the PTO, copyright comes into existence at the time of fixation 
in a tangible medium of expression.157 This low barrier to protection could 
provide a number of policy benefits. For example, it would greatly reduce 
the cost, effort, and time associated with securing intellectual property 
protection for EGC and associated biotechnological products, such as 
recombinant seeds. The Report of the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) specifically 
recognized this as one of the benefits of extending copyright protection to 
software, predicting that, because copyright exists from the moment a work 
is fixed, “copyright is likely to be increasingly important in protecting 
computer programs, particularly those of small entrepreneurs who create 
their works for individual consumers and can neither afford or properly use 
other forms of protection.”158 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 158. NATIONAL COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL 
REPORT at 15 (1978) [hereinafter “CONTU Report”]. Congress established CONTU in the 
1970s to study and make recommendations as to how the copyright law should respond to 
various technological developments, most notably the increasing significance of computer 
programs. See id. at 1. The commission was specifically directed to consider and make 
recommendations with respect to the question of whether, and to what extent, computer 
programs could be protected under current copyright law and whether copyright law should 
be amended to accommodate computer programs. See id. CONTU issued its highly 
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The ease with which the requirement of fixation is satisfied could 
encourage early disclosure of newly created engineered genetic sequences. 
When the developer of a biotechnology product based on EGC relies on 
trade secret and patents, there is an incentive to maintain the secrecy of the 
code, at least until a patent application is filed. But because copyright vests 
as soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium159 - which could be in written 
form or embodied in a DNA molecule - it becomes less necessary to 
maintain secrecy or to secure confidentiality agreements and contractual 
restrictions or to file a patent application in order to secure some proprietary 
position. Again, the CONTU Report specifically identified this as one of 
the benefits of copyright for computer programs, noting that copyright 
protection reduces the cost associated with maintaining secrecy, and that it 
also promotes public dissemination.160 
C. Limitations on Infringement Liability 
A number of the established doctrines pertaining to copyright 
infringement could be interpreted in a manner that promotes innovation in 
EGC and synthetic biology in general, while at the same time addresses 
attendant policy concerns. Again, precedent gleaned from software 
copyright cases could prove extremely valuable in shaping the contours of 
infringement liability for EGC. 
1. The Requirement of Actual Copying 
Infringement of copyright’s reproduction right requires proof of actual 
copying.161 As a corollary, independent creation of a copyrighted work does 
not constitute copyright infringement, even if the two works are identical.162 
This fundamental feature of copyright law has important policy 
implications and should alleviate many of the concerns raised with respect 
to extension of copyright to DNA. For example, some might question 
whether copyright on an EGC might inadvertently cover a naturally 
occurring DNA molecule that happens to share the same sequence. But if 
someone came up with a synthetic sequence and it turned out that the 
                                                                                                                 
influential Final Report in 1978, which concluded not only that copyright protection for 
computer programs was justified both in terms of legal doctrine and innovation policy but 
that computer programs in fact already were copyrightable under both the 1976 and 1909 
Copyright Acts. Id. at 16-17.  
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  
 160. Id. at 17. 
 161. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 162. Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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sequence actually already existed in nature, it would not constitute 
infringement for someone else to subsequently discover the naturally 
occurring version. Furthermore, anyone seeking to use that DNA sequence 
could do so without infringing, because they would be copying from the 
natural sequence rather than from the copyrighted synthetic one, regardless 
of whether or not the synthetic sequence was copyrighted before the 
discovery of the natural one. 
Copyright is particularly suited to policing against unauthorized literal 
copying. In the context of software, literal copying typically equates with 
piracy, i.e., the illicit reproduction of exact copies of a software product. 
EGC is likewise particularly vulnerable to piracy, especially when it is 
made widely available to consumers in a self-replicable format, such as a 
seed.163 Copyright law’s prohibition against literal copying could prove 
very useful in preventing piracy of engineered DNA products. In the case of 
a complex piece of EGC, proving literal infringement should be 
straightforward, and in many instances, copyright would likely be much 
easier to enforce than patent rights. 
There are important limitations, however, even in the context of literal 
infringement. Literal copying is not infringement, for example, if the 
copying is limited to the ideas of a work, as discussed below.164 On the 
other hand, copyright has a number of advantages over patents in terms of 
enforceability, such as civil forfeiture provisions,165 impoundment,166 
criminal sanctions,167 and provisions for enlisting the aid of the U.S 
Customs Service in blocking the importation of pirated copies.168 
2. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
The protection afforded by copyright does not “extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, 
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”169 Section 102(b) codifies this 
longstanding common-law principle known as the “idea-expression 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See Holman, A Bellwether, supra note 26, at 670. 
 164. See infra Section VI.C.2. 
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012). 
 166. 17 id. § 503. 
 167. Id. § 506; 18 id. § 2319. 
 168. 19 C.F.R. § 133.31 (2016). 
 169. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
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dichotomy.”170 The prohibition against copyrighting ideas, methods of 
operation, and the like has often been invoked as a policy lever to limit the 
scope of copyright protection with respect to software.171 Similarly, it could 
serve as a useful lever to regulate and limit the scope of protection available 
for engineered DNA.  
For example, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., the 
court explained “that in the context before us, a program for an operating 
system, the line [between idea and expression] must be a pragmatic one, 
which also keeps in consideration ‘the preservation of the balance between 
competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.’”172 
The court found that the focus of the issue of copyrightability must be on 
whether the underlying idea is capable of alternate modes of expression.173 
As applied to operating system software, the court found that “[i]f other 
programs can be written or created which perform the same function as 
Apple’s operating system program, then that program is an expression of 
the idea and hence copyrightable.”174 The same rationale should apply to 
EGC: EGC is copyrightable if, and only if, alternative non-copyrighted 
EGC can be designed which performs the same function. 
When courts first began applying the idea-expression dichotomy to 
software, they struggled with the incongruity between software and 
traditionally copyrightable material.175 Unlike traditional copyrightable 
subject matter, software tends to be primarily functional, lacking readily 
identifiable aesthetic elements (at least to a lay observer).176 Fortunately, 
the numerous judicial decisions involving copyright protection for software 
issued over the last four decades provide a useful roadmap as to how to go 
about incorporating similar limitations with respect to EGC, facilitated by 
the close analogy between EGC and computer code.177 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670. 
 171. See infra Section VI.C.2. 
 172. 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. 
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(citing SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Comput. Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829 (M.D. Tenn. 
1985)) (“The essentially utilitarian nature of a computer program further complicates the 
task of distilling its idea from its expression.”). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See generally 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 59, § 13.03. 
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The idea-expression dichotomy has been invoked in the context of 
software as a doctrinal tool for limiting the scope of protection in a manner 
that does not tie up software function, but instead extends only the 
particular code used to achieve that function and relatively close variants 
thereof.178 This modern manifestation of the dichotomy has resulted in a 
copyright regime that leaves open the ability of others to engineer computer 
programs that achieve the same functionality, while still creating a basis for 
liability in the case of piracy and direct copying. Importantly, although 
patents have been granted that broadly cover software-implemented 
algorithms and which are not limited to any specific code used to achieve 
that implementation, under well-established principles of copyright law, the 
algorithm itself cannot be copyrighted, only the specific code used to 
implement it (and in some cases involving non-literal infringement, 
relatively close variants).179 Today, the courts routinely invalidate software 
patent claims of this type, invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice, 
and revealing that the scope of protection provided by these patents was 
largely illusory.180 Although the protection provided by copyright is 
substantially narrower, it has been much less controversial and shows no 
signs of being undercut in the manner that patent protection has been. 
The idea-expression dichotomy could be enlisted as a policy lever to 
limit the scope of protection available for EGC as compared to other 
copyrighted works. Feist suggests that factual works will often receive only 
relatively “thin protection.”181 Based on this aspect of Feist, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit has, for example, found only thin protection 
for maps, essentially limiting the protection to original selection and 
arrangement of expressive elements.182 Analogous reasoning could support 
similarly narrow protection for EGC. 
Delineating the boundary between idea and expression is far from an 
exact science, as aptly noted by Judge Learned Hand: 
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident 
is left out. . . . [T]here is a point in this series of abstractions 
where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the 
[copyright owner] could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id.; see also Altai, 982 F.2d at 714. 
 179. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219-20 (1981). 
 180. See Sachs, supra note 48. 
 181. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991).  
 182. Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 748 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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apart from their expression, his property is never extended. 
Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody 
ever can.183 
But it is this very ambiguity that courts have leveraged in applying the 
idea-expression dichotomy in a manner designed to promote innovation 
policy in the context of software, and which could likewise be enlisted to 
meter the scope of protection available to engineered DNA. Depending 
upon where a court draws the boundary between idea and expression, which 
as Judge Learned Hand notes is open to considerable judgment and 
discretion, non-literal copying can constitute either infringing appropriation 
of expression or non-infringing use of an uncopyrightable idea. 
An example of this principle at work arose in the case of Kregos v. 
Associated Press, where judges of a Second Circuit panel came to opposite 
conclusions on a question of non-literal infringement, based on the level of 
abstraction at which the idea of the copyrighted work was defined.184 The 
copyrighted work was a “baseball pitching form” providing various 
statistics “concerning the past performances of the opposing pitchers 
scheduled to start each day’s baseball games.”185 The two-judge majority 
sided with the district court and defined the idea of the work as “to publish 
in outcome predictive pitching form.”186 Since there are multiple ways of 
expressing this idea, according to these judges, copyright protection was 
available for the plaintiff’s specific selection of statistics. In contrast, the 
dissenting judge contended that the plaintiff’s idea is that “the nine statistics 
he has selected are the most significant ones to consider when attempting to 
predict the outcome of a baseball game. Unquestionably, if that is the idea 
for purposes of merger analysis, the merger of that idea and its expression 
has occurred - by definition.”187 This judge would have denied plaintiff any 
scope of protection. By analogy, the same analysis could be used to justify 
either thin protection, or no protection at all, for an ECG, depending on the 
policy leanings of a judge deciding the matter. 
a) Merger Doctrine 
The merger doctrine is a manifestation of the idea-expression dichotomy 
that could be applied to meter the scope of copyright protection available 
                                                                                                                 
 183. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 184. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 185. Id. at 702.  
 186. Id. at 706 (citation omitted).  
 187. Id. 
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for EGC. Under the merger doctrine, if an idea “can only be expressed in a 
limited number of ways,” those means of expression “cannot be protected, 
lest one author own the idea itself.”188 Under such circumstances, the idea 
and its expression are considered “merged.”189 For example, if, within a 
given technological environment, computer code must be drafted in a 
specific way in order to instruct the computer to carry out a particular 
function, then the expression “merges” with the function, rendering the 
code uncopyrightable. 
In Altai, for example, the court began by describing the line between idea 
and expression as a pragmatic one, particularly in the case of software, 
which courts should delineate on the basis of policy.190 Applying this 
principle, the court concluded that software features “dictated by 
considerations of efficiency” are not protectable, since “the more efficient a 
set of modules are, the more closely they approximate the idea or process 
embodied in that particular aspect of the program’s structure.”191 Altai 
noted that  
[w]hile, hypothetically, there might be a myriad of ways in 
which a programmer may effectuate certain functions within a 
program,-- i.e., express the idea embodied in a given subroutine -
- efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of 
choice as to make only one or two forms of expression workable 
options.192 
On the other hand, the court recognized that “[o]f course, not all program 
structure is informed by efficiency concerns.”193 Based on these 
considerations, the court concluded that  
in order to determine whether the merger doctrine precludes 
copyright protection to an aspect of a program’s structure that is 
so oriented, a court must inquire “whether the use of this 
particular set of modules is necessary efficiently to implement 
that part of the program’s process” being implemented. If the 
answer is yes, then the expression represented by the 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 189. See id. at 103. 
 190. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 191. Id. at 707-08. 
 192. Id. at 708. 
 193. Id. 
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programmer’s choice of a specific module or group of modules 
has merged with their underlying idea and is unprotected.194  
Similarly, if there are only a few ways of expressing a given idea, the 
available scope of protection can be extremely narrow. For example, in a 
recent case involving a photographer who took photos of a vodka 
manufacturer’s blue vodka bottle and then sued the vodka manufacture for 
using someone else’s photographs in its advertisements, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that this “litigation is fundamentally 
about how many ways one can create an advertising photograph . . . of a 
blue vodka bottle. We conclude there are not very many.”195 Because of the 
limited number of ways of expressing the idea, the court held that only 
“virtually identical copy” would be actionable.196 Similarly, in a case where 
there are limited ways of achieving the function of a given EGC, that 
sequence might be afforded extremely narrow scope of protection. 
As a corollary, the fact that two software programs both use the same 
efficient means of accomplishing some function is not necessarily probative 
of copying.197 
The Federal Circuit recently addressed merger in the context of software 
in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.198 The court began by noting that, as 
applied to computer programs, the merger doctrine “means that when 
specific [parts of the code], even though previously copyrighted, are the 
only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by 
another will not amount to infringement.”199 At the same time, the court 
observed, the “unique arrangement of computer program expression . . . 
does not merge with the process so long as alternate expressions are 
available.”200 With respect to the software at issue in the case, merger did 
not apply because “[t]he evidence showed that Oracle had ‘unlimited 
options as to the selection and arrangement of the 7000 lines Google 
copied.’”201 The Federal Circuit pointed out that the district court had 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or 
Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of 
Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 902-03 (1990)). 
 195. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 196. Id.  
 197. Altai, 982 F.2d at 709. 
 198. 750 F.3d 1339, 1358-62 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 199. Id. at 1360 (alteration in original) (quoting Altai, 982 F.2d at 708). 
 200. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 
F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 201. Id. at 1361 (citation omitted). 
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“erred in focusing its merger analysis on the options available to Google at 
the time of copying. It is well established that copyrightability and the 
scope of protectable activity are to be evaluated at the time of creation, not 
at the time of infringement.”202 
Many of the policy-driven applications of the merger doctrine to 
software could be readily extended to EGC. For example, the sequence of a 
cDNA molecule corresponds exactly to a naturally occurring mRNA from 
which it is derived, and could be denied copyright protection under the 
merger doctrine, based on the rationale that there is only one way to express 
that particular idea. Even if there are many ways of achieving the same 
outcome, such as encoding a specific protein, if only a very limited number 
of those alternatives are the most efficient, then under principles of merger 
those most efficient might be ineligible for copyright protection. This could 
be the case, for example, when a particular optimized codon sequence is 
deemed necessary for the most efficient expression of a protein. 
b) Scènes-à-faire  
As recently observed by the Second Circuit, “the doctrine of ‘scènes-à-
faire’ teaches that elements of a work that are ‘indispensable, or at least 
standard, in the treatment of a given topic’—like cowboys, bank robbers, 
and shootouts in stories of the American West—get no protection.”203 In 
Altai, the court applied the scènes-à-faire doctrine to deny copyright 
protection to elements of a computer program “dictated by external 
factors.”204 The court cited Professor Nimmer for the proposition that “in 
many instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform 
particular functions in a specific computing environment without 
employing standard techniques.”205 The court found this to be the  
result of the fact that a programmer’s freedom of design choice 
is often circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) the 
mechanical specifications of the computer on which a particular 
program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of 
other programs with which a program is designed to operate in 
conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4) 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. 
 203. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis 
added) (internal citation omitted). 
 204. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 205. Id. (quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
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demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted 
programming practices within the computer industry.206  
The court concluded that, in assessing the copyright protection of software, 
the court must “examine the structural content of [the] allegedly 
[infringing] program for elements that might [be] dictated by external 
factors.”207 Those elements will not receive copyright protection.208 
The Altai court also found that elements of a computer program taken 
from the public domain are not protectable, but are instead free for the 
taking by the general public, regardless of whether it might be included in 
an otherwise copyrighted work.209 With respect to software, the court found 
that this precluded, for example, copyright for program elements that might 
have “entered the public domain by virtue of freely accessible program 
exchanges and the like.”210 Generally speaking, some computer routines 
may be so standard in the programming industry that the scènes-à-faire 
doctrine deprives them of copyright protection. 
In Oracle, the Federal Circuit noted that “[i]n the computer context, ‘the 
scenes a faire doctrine denies protection to program elements that are 
dictated by external factors such as “the mechanical specifications of the 
computer on which a particular program is intended to run” or “widely 
accepted programming practices within the computer industry.”’”211 The 
court noted that the scènes-à-faire doctrine, like merger, is a component of 
the infringement analysis, and as such “the expression is not excluded from 
copyright protection; it is just that certain copying is forgiven as a necessary 
incident of any expression of the underlying idea.”212  
Like merger, the scenes a faire doctrine, as it has developed with respect 
to software, could be readily applied to EGC. Certain genetic elements 
might be considered so standard that they would be denied copyright 
protection, even if incorporated into an otherwise copyrightable genetic 
sequence. Furthermore, genetic elements and motifs dictated by external 
                                                                                                                 
 206. Id. at 709-10 (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 1991 ED., supra note 205, at 13-66-71). 
 207. Id. at 710. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc'ns Inc., 118 F.3d, 955 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
 212. Id. at 1364 (citing Satava v. Lowery, 323 F.3d 805, 810 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The 
Ninth Circuit treats scenes a faire as a defense to infringement rather than as a barrier to 
copyrightability.”)). 
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considerations, derived from the public domain, or routinely found in EGC 
could likewise be excluded from copyright under a policy-driven 
interpretation of the scenes a faire doctrine. 
3. Non-Literal Copyright Infringement 
It is well established that copyright extends not only to the literal aspects 
(i.e., the actual text) of an original literary work, but also to its non-literal 
aspects, such as the plot of a novel - at least to the extent those non-literal 
aspects are original.213 As Judge Learned Hand observed, “[i]t is of course 
essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right cannot be 
limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial 
variations.”214 “Thus, where ‘the fundamental essence or structure of one 
work is duplicated in another,’ courts have found copyright 
infringement.”215 In Altai, the Second Circuit reasoned that “if the non-
literal structures of literary works are protected by copyright; and if 
computer programs are literary works, as we are told by the legislature; 
then the non-literal structures of computer programs are protected by 
copyright.”216 Similarly, in Oracle, the Federal Circuit endorsed Ninth 
Circuit case law recognizing that the structure, sequence, and organization 
of a computer program is eligible for copyright protection where it qualifies 
as an expression of an idea, rather than the idea itself.217 
Just as the Altai court relied on analogy to other literary works, the 
analogy between engineered DNA and software supports the idea that non-
literal protection should be available for EGC. But as noted in Altai, the 
recognition of the existence of non-literal protection does not end that 
analysis. The court must still “determine the scope of copyright protection 
that extends to a computer program’s non-literal structure,” and, thus, 
courts can use this doctrine as a policy lever to adjust the scope of 
protection for EGC.218 
                                                                                                                 
 213. See, e.g., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
 214. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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Altai emphasized that, in distinguishing idea from expression, the court 
should emphasize “practical considerations” rather than relying “too 
heavily on metaphysical distinctions.”219 The court based this policy on the 
functional characteristics of computer programs as compared to other more 
traditional copyrightable works.220 This focus on practical considerations 
should also apply to EGC. 
Another important characteristic shared by software and EGC is that 
both typically embody a modular structure and, as such, are readily 
susceptible to representation at different levels of abstraction.221 At a low 
level of abstraction, software is, of course, described by its code. All but the 
most simple computer programs, however, comprise structured 
arrangements of modules, e.g., subroutines and parameter lists, which are 
better represented by a more abstract organizational structure or 
flowchart.222 The modules can themselves often be broken down into more 
basic subroutines and other more fundamental elements, a description of 
which would result in a somewhat less abstract representation of the 
software, somewhere between a high level flow chart and literal code.223 
The modular nature of software facilitates the design of complex software 
programs, since an engineer working at a higher level of abstraction can 
focus on the selection and arrangement of modules without concerning 
herself with the specific code underlying those modules.224 The modular 
nature of software has led courts to conceptualize software at varying levels 
of abstraction and to establish that non-literal copyright infringement can 
exist in cases where the structure of module arrangements has been copied, 
even in the absence of literal copying of the code.225 
As described in a previous article, synthetic biologists are increasingly 
conceptualizing engineered genetic sequences at different levels of 
abstraction and taking advantage of the modular nature of genes and genetic 
control elements to facilitate design of increasingly complex synthetic DNA 
sequences.226 Not only does the complexity and modular nature of the 
information content of engineered genetic sequences support an extension 
of copyright to protect them, it also suggests that protection against non-
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literal copying of higher-order structures might be appropriate. Software 
copyright cases could provide useful precedent for cases involving these 
more complex EGCs where the court applied an abstraction test like those 
described below and where the court considered issues of non-literal 
copying. 
The standard test for non-literal infringement centers around a search for 
“substantial similarity.”227 In order to determine whether an allegedly 
infringing work is substantially similar to a copyrighted work, courts have 
traditionally applied an “ordinary observer” test.228 However, in Whelan 
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit found the ordinary observer test unsuited for assessing substantial 
similarity in the context of copyrighted computer software.229 In view of the 
complexity of computer software and the general public's unfamiliarity with 
the subject, the court held that it made little sense to expect an ordinary 
juror to make the determination.230 Instead, the proper audience for 
assessing substantial similarity of computer programs is one skilled in the 
technology of computer programming.231 For the same reason, an 
assessment of substantial similarity of engineered genetic sequences should 
be made by one skilled in molecular biology. 
Oracle illustrates the potential for relatively broad non-literal protection 
of computer code. In Oracle, the court applied fundamental principles of 
copyright law to assess infringement, such as evaluating the originality and 
creativity of the software and considering whether there were alternative 
ways to implement similar functions, ultimately concluding that Google had 
non-literally infringed Oracle’s copyright in its software.232 The court 
repeatedly rejected Google’s arguments premised on the alleged functional 
and utilitarian nature of Oracle’s software.233 The court also rejected 
                                                                                                                 
 227. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.  
 228. Id. at 713 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). 
 229. 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 230. Id. at 1247.  
 231. Id. at 1232. 
 232. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he SSO 
is original and creative, and . . . could have been written and organized in any number of 
ways and still have achieved the same functions.”). 
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Google’s assertion that there should be no overlap between the scope of 
protection conferred by patent and copyright.234 
In Oracle, the Federal Circuit applied the “abstraction-filtration-
comparison” test in assessing whether the non-literal elements of Oracle’s 
computer program constituted protectable expression, noting that the test 
addresses the utilitarian nature of computer programs.235 The court noted 
that this test was formulated by the Second Circuit, endorsed by the Ninth 
Circuit, and has been expressly adopted by several other circuits.236 In 
applying the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the court analyzes the 
work at different levels of abstraction and then filters out unprotectable 
elements, even if those elements are expressive.237 If the court determines 
that any expression, at any level of abstraction, “is dictated by 
considerations of efficiency, required by factors already external to the 
program itself, or taken from the public domain,” that expression is to be 
treated as unprotectable and not considered in the assessment for non-literal 
similarity.238 A modified version of this test could likewise be fashioned for 
EGC to achieve a scope of non-literal protection appropriate from the 
perspective of innovation policy. 
4. De minimis Copying 
The judge-made doctrine of de minimis copying might also shield some 
forms of benign, or even socially useful, copying of EGC from 
infringement liability. In Davis v. The Gap, Inc., the Second Circuit 
provided the following explanation of the de minimis doctrine, as well as its 
policy underpinning:  
Trivial copying is a significant part of modern life. Most honest 
citizens in the modern world frequently engage, without 
hesitation, in trivial copying that, but for the de minimis doctrine, 
would technically constitute a violation of law. We do not 
hesitate to make a photocopy of a letter from a friend to show 
another friend, or other favorite cartoon to post on the 
                                                                                                                 
 234. Id. at 1380 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)) (“Importantly for our 
purposes, the Supreme Court has made clear that ‘[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any 
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 235. Id. at 1358. 
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refrigerator. Parents in Central Park photograph their children 
perched on Josè de Creeft’s Alice in Wonderland sculpture. We 
record television programs aired while we are out, so as to watch 
them at a more convenient hour. Waiters at a restaurant sing 
“Happy Birthday” at a patron’s table. When we do such things, it 
is not that we are breaking the law but unlikely to be sued given 
the high cost of litigation. Because of the de minimis doctrine, in 
trivial instances of copying, we are in fact not breaking the 
law.239 
Application of this doctrine might particularly be useful in shielding DIY 
synthetic biologists and other non-commercial actors from liability. There is 
an overlap between the de minimis defense and fair use, a critically 
important aspect of copyright law to which I will now turn. 
5. Fair Use 
The doctrine of fair use originated in the courts and was codified by 
Congress in 1976.240 In essence, it permits certain otherwise infringing uses 
of a copyrighted work when enforcing a copyright would “stifle the very 
creativity which [copyright] law is designed to foster.”241 Fair use helps to 
resolve “the inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect 
copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it.”242 It has been 
characterized as an “equitable rule of reason.”243  
Fair use could play an important role in facilitating certain socially 
desirable uses of copyrighted EGC. For example, courts have held that 
“where there is good reason for studying or examining the unprotected 
aspects of a computer program, disassembly for purposes of such study or 
examination constitutes fair use.”244 Thus, it is often possible for a 
competitor to deconstruct a copyrighted computer program to understand its 
functionality and then use that knowledge to write software that achieves 
the same functionality by means of different code without incurring liability 
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for infringement. Copying of protected elements within copyrighted 
software is permissible fair use if such copying is reasonably necessary in 
order to access unprotected elements.245  
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit 
found that copying of Sega’s software in the course of disassembling the 
object code embedded in the game software would ordinarily constitute 
infringement, but in this case was fair use.246 “[W]here disassembly is the 
only way to gain access to ideas and functional elements embodied in a 
copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for 
seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a 
matter of law.”247 Similarly, in Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo Inc., the 
Federal Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit controlling law, said that Atari 
could make fair use of the Nintendo program to derive unprotected ideas 
and processes.248 The court also indicated that Atari could incorporate into 
its games aspects of the Nintendo program necessary to unlock the 
Nintendo console.249 
Applying the same principle to copyrighted EGC, one should be allowed 
to copy and manipulate engineered DNA sequences in order to understand 
unprotected aspects, such as functional attributes of the engineered 
sequence, without obtaining authorization from the copyright owner. This 
contrasts with patent law, with respect to which there is no fair use doctrine, 
and only a minimal (at best) experimental use exception.250 
Fair use is also enlisted as a doctrinal tool to address interoperability and 
lock-in concerns.251 For example, in Atari, the court indicated that Atari 
could incorporate into its games various aspects of the Nintendo program 
necessary to unlock the Nintendo console.252 With respect to EGC, fair use 
could be invoked in a similar manner as a means for addressing analogous 
concerns. 
A work’s publication status can be a significant consideration in the fair 
use analysis: in general, unpublished works are afforded more protection 
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than published works.253 The contours of what constitutes “publication” 
with respect to EGC would no doubt need to be worked out by the courts, 
but there could be some policy benefit to providing heightened protection 
for EGC in cases in which the creator seeks to limit disclosure, relative to a 
situation where the copyright owner more purposefully disseminates the 
DNA sequence information. 
One of the ideas suggested by the CPP group is for the Copyright Office 
to “provide fair use ‘opinion letters.’”254 CPP has also suggested that 
market failures, which render it difficult to obtain clearance, should be 
considered a factor in fair use.255 These suggestions could find particular 
applicability in the context of EGC. 
6. Inadvertent Infringement 
The potential for inadvertent infringement of EGC-based patents has 
been much discussed, and similar concerns would no doubt arise with 
respect to copyright on EGC, given that copyright infringement has often 
been characterized as a matter of strict liability.256 Particularly when 
dictated by considerations of policy, however, courts have required a 
showing of at least some element of volition or causation for a finding of 
infringement.257 For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom 
On-Line Communication Services, Inc., the district court refused to impose 
direct liability on an Internet service provider, reasoning that “[a]lthough 
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of 
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant system is merely 
used to create a copy by a third party.”258 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit has endorsed Netcom, noting that  
to establish direct liability under . . . the Act, something more 
must be shown that mere ownership of a machine used by others 
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to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing conduct 
with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying 
that one could conclude that the machine owner himself 
trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.259 
In Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the Second Circuit 
recently cited CoStar Group with approval, “reject[ing] the contention that 
‘the Netcom decision was driven by expedience and that its holding is 
inconsistent with the established law of copyright,’ and [finding Netcom] ‘a 
particularly rational interpretation of § 106,’ rather than a special-purpose 
rule applicable only to ISPs.”260 The Second Circuit found that the district 
court improperly “pigeon-holed the conclusions reached in Netcom and its 
progeny as ‘premised on the unique attributes of the Internet.’”261 To the 
contrary, the Second Circuit held that  
[w]hile the Netcom court was plainly concerned with a theory of 
direct liability that would effectively ‘hold the entire Internet 
liable’ for the conduct of a single user, its reasoning and 
conclusions, consistent with the precedents of this court and the 
Supreme Court, and with the text of the Copyright Act, 
transcend the Internet.262  
The court further held that “[w]hen there is a dispute as to the author of an 
allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct 
our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made.”263 
The rationale underlying these decisions apply in the context of EGC to 
shield parties from accusations of direct copyright infringement in the 
absence of sufficient evidence of volitional conduct. For example, a 
farmer’s field could be analogized to the “machine” mentioned in CoStar 
Group, and by analogy, mere ownership of the farmland is not sufficient to 
create liability if copyrighted seeds are found growing in the field without 
authorization. Instead, in order to prevail, a copyright owner would be 
required to prove some volitional conduct “with a nexus sufficiently close 
and causal to the illegal copying.”264 
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Congress might also consider creating statutory safe-harbor provisions to 
protect certain entities that, as a practical matter, would find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to avoid unintentionally indirectly infringing copyright in 
EGC. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) created safe 
harbors for Internet service providers (“ISPs”),265 and similar rights could 
be appropriate for entities such as DNA synthesis companies like ATUM, 
firms such as Biobricks Foundation that provide modular EGCs to synthetic 
biologists,266 or perhaps even research institutions that work with large 
numbers of engineered sequences. With respect to engineered seeds and 
agriculture, safe harbors could be made available to grain elevator 
operators, seed banks, and other “gatekeepers.” 
Just as the DMCA requires ISPs to take a number of positive steps 
towards avoiding infringement in order to qualify for the safeguard and 
provides that ISPs must comply with “standard technical measures” 
employed by rights owners to identify and block infringement,267 there 
should be a requirement that, in order to benefit from an EGC-specific safe 
harbor, a firm must adopt and cooperate with technical measures designed 
to detect and counter infringement. The CPP has noted that since the 
enactment of the DMCA  
technologies have become much better at recognizing and 
filtering out infringing copies of works available on or being 
distributed via the Internet[, and most] of this technology has 
been developed by small entrepreneurs who see a potential 
market for the technology among service providers and content 
companies. The technology is increasingly “smart,” that is, 
capable of determining, for example, how much of a copyrighted 
movie is contained in a given online file and even whether the 
file combines video or audio tracks from the movie with new 
material.268  
In a similar manner, the creation of a DMCA-like safe harbor regime for 
EGC copyright could incentivize the development of technologies that 
could be used to quickly and efficiently identify copyrighted EGC. This 
would leverage the ability of firms such as these to serve as “gatekeepers,” 
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with the benefit of shifting enforcement activities away from individual 
users of EGC.269 
D. Subject Matter-Specific Statutory Limitations, Exemptions, and 
Compulsory Licenses 
Although there are a few subject matter-specific exceptions or limitations 
in patent law and none relating specifically to ECG, they are quite common 
in the Copyright Statute. For example, section 106(4) omits sound 
recordings from the list of works whose copyright holders have a general 
right of public performance;270 sections 114 and 115 provide compulsory 
licenses for certain uses of sound recordings;271 sections 111 and 118 create 
compulsory licenses for secondary transmissions of broadcast programming 
by cable systems and for public broadcasting, respectively;272 section 117 
provides exemptions from liability for certain otherwise-infringing uses of 
copyrighted software;273 and section 104 creates exemptions for various 
acts of technical infringement involving teaching, private homes, and public 
performance without commercial advantage.274 
In a similar manner, Congress could create subject matter-specific 
limitations with respect to the availability and/or enforceability of copyright 
on EGC. For example, exemptions could be crafted for certain socially 
desirable activities, such as teaching or noncommercial use. Compulsory 
licensing could be considered as a means for addressing concerns about 
transaction costs or collective-action concerns and would likely incentivize 
more efficient private-sector solutions analogous to BMI, ASCAP, and the 
Copyright Clearance Center.275 The fact that there is much greater 
precedent for such alternatives in copyright compared to the patent statute 
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could be seen as an advantage of enlisting copyright as an alternative form 
of protection for EGC. 
For example, consider 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), which provides that  
[the] exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to 
duplicate . . . . The exclusive right of the owner of a copyright in 
a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to 
the right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds 
fixed in the sound recording are . . . altered in sequence or 
quality. The exclusive rights of the [copyright] owner [under 
either clause] do not extend to the making or duplication of 
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent 
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or 
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.276 
As explained by Patry on Copyright: 
As a result [of 114(b)], where a sound recording is re-recorded 
using either the same or different musicians, no infringement of 
the sound recording results since the actual sounds of the 
original are not duplicated. This is also the case where some, but 
not all, of the original musicians who performed on the first 
sound recording are replaced on the new sound recording, and 
the replacement musicians copy as closely as possible (or in the 
case of the derivative right, adapt) the original musician's 
performance.277 
One could imagine analogous restrictions on EGC copyright, which would 
limit infringement to copies of DNA whose origin can be traced directly 
back to the copyrighted EGC. Significantly, this would limit infringement 
to someone who directly produces copies of copyrighted EGC, such as a 
farmer who saves and replants seeds bearing copyrighted DNA. On the 
other hand, it would provide an exemption from liability for someone who 
actually goes to the trouble of synthesizing the DNA de novo, even if that 
individual had access to the copyrighted sequence and sought to emulate it, 
or even to reproduce it identically. Although this approach might result in 
copyright for EGC that is too easy to circumvent, thus providing an 
inadequate incentive for innovators, it does illustrate the fact that Congress 
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has at its disposal a variety of methods for limiting the scope of copyright 
protection for EGC if it decides that doing so would further good public 
policy. 
E. Remedies 
Remedies could be another lever for addressing some of the policy 
concerns that have been expressed regarding the potential for copyright on 
EGC to adversely affect follow-on innovation. Particularly since eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the courts have recognized that, once liability is 
found, an injunction is not always the appropriate remedy.278 In cases where 
a copyrighted EGC is incorporated into a larger genetic work, for example, 
the appropriate remedy might be some sort of reasonable royalty that 
permits continued use of the copyrighted work.279 The CPP found that 
“[a]lternative relief may also be appropriate in cases where there is a 
collective action problem or a market failure due to high transaction costs 
which leads to a difficulty in clearing all of the rights necessary from a 
multitude of copyright owners.”280 
F. Open-Source Licensing 
In the context of software, open source is well established, and best 
practices are already in place.281 Many of these practices, along with 
experiential knowledge that has been generated in connection with the 
open-source movement, could be adapted for use in the context of 
biotechnology and EGC. In addition, the courts are developing a body of 
case law that provides guidance as to how to effectively use copyright to 
promote open source. In Jacobsen v. Katzer, for example, the Federal 
Circuit upheld the enforceability of an open-source copyright license,282 a 
move seen by many as validating and supporting the open-source 
movement, at least in the context of copyright.283 While this precedent is 
arising primarily in the context of software, it should facilitate accelerated 
adoption of open source as a viable alternative for biotechnology. Patents, 
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on the other hand, seem less suited to serve as the foundation for a well-
functioning, open-source biotechnology movement.284 
VII. Conclusion 
Although extending copyright to EGC would raise plausible policy 
concerns, it should be possible to effectively ameliorate them by 
interpreting, and if necessary limiting, copyright law in a manner that 
promotes innovation. This has often been the case in the past when 
copyright law has extended to new subject matter, such as sound 
recordings, which are afforded much narrower rights than other 
copyrightable materials, and software, which has also been limited for 
technology-specific policy reasons. The potential positive benefits of 
extending copyright to EGC should be seriously considered, and if they are 
found substantial, as I believe they are, it only makes sense to move toward 
a copyright regime that accommodates genetic sequences, including any 
necessary safeguards and restrictions, rather than holding to the current 
status quo that denies them copyright protection altogether. 
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